A. N. Whitehead, who acknowledged himself as a spiritual successor of Plato, developed in his *Process and Reality* a bold and profound cosmology based substantially on Plato's metaphysical thought in the dialogue *Timaeus*. He did not only formulate that famous phrase characterizing the European philosophical tradition as “a series of footnotes to Plato,” but also recognized his own “Philosophy of Organism” as a version of ‘Plato’s general point of view with the least changes.’

Here I quote some passages in the *Process and Reality*, which may remind us vividly the metaphysical framework of the Platonic cosmology in the *Timaeus*.

‘The actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which the barren insufficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization.’

‘The origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder,...’

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*Keywords: Whitehead, Nishida, Fujisawa, Plato’s Cosmology*

1) Acknowledgements: This is a revised version of my paper ‘Matrix of the Good’ which was read in the session of The First World Olympic Congress of Philosophy, Athens and Spetses, 27/June–3/August/2004.


'For the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of order establishing a cosmic epoch.'

The above quotations altogether correspond straightforwardly to the metaphysical framework of the Platonic cosmology in the Timaeus which narrates the role of the Demiurge in the creation of the cosmos and the necessity of the third kind (γενος) which makes its appearance between (1) a kind of paradigm and (2) an image of a paradigm (48e–49a).

The Process and Reality as an epoch-making philosophical achievement in the twentieth century, I believe, exemplifies par excellence the vitality of Plato’s philosophical thinking. Thus we can safely say that Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism is a typical case which testifies a fact that Plato’s conception in the Timaeus has still an extraordinary power to provoke the modern intellects into building their great metaphysical theories.

In the following, I want to show you some similar cases that Japanese philosophers too were enlightened by Plato’s insight; I mean the cases of Fujisawa Norio and Nishida Kitarō. They too, being encouraged and guided by Plato’s conception of "χώρα," developed their original ideas. Fujisawa presented a fresh interpretation of Plato’s later philosophy; and Nishida, a contemporary of Whitehead, developed a bold metaphysical viewpoint which might be regarded as an achievement ranking with M. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit.

II

To illuminate the point of Fujisawa’s achievement, let me refer again a little while to Whitehead’s words which I have just quoted: ‘The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal.’ The purport of this expression could be paraphrased by another expression that ‘the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence.’ Both expressions refer to a situation where an ‘actual entity’ as the final real thing of the world arises.

In Platonic terms, it is the case that a sensible particular (x) participates in the Form (φ).

Then, if the sentence in question is taken to be equivalent to that ‘the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things

5) Ibid.
8) He deceased recently (February, 2004).
9) Whitehead’s technical terms: ‘the things which are temporal’ (—actual entities) and ‘the things which are eternal’ (—the eternal objects) correspond respectively to Plato’s ‘the sensible particulars’ and ‘the Forms’.
which constitute the potentialities,' and in that case, if the “ingression” appearing in this context may be regarded as a case that a particular field in Space-Time participates immediately in the eternal object itself, it seems, the unbridgeable chasm between Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics, which has been covered by Whitehead’s integration between them, will rise to the surface.

In spite of Whitehead’s intention to unify the both philosophers’ metaphysical principles, there was in reality a discordant element between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions about individuals; in reality, Aristotle at Phys. Δ 2. 209b11-13, based on his conception of the substance and matter, severely criticized Plato in respect of his “confusion” between “place” and “matter.” He said: ‘For this reason Plato also says in the Timaeus that matter ( khôra) and space (χώραν) are the same, for that which is capable of receiving (μεταληπτικόν) and space are one and the same.’

It is on this occasion that Fujisawa criticized Aristotle. In his paper ‘Ἐρευν, Μετέχειν, and Idioms of “Paradeigmatism”’ Fujsawa insisted as follows:

‘Nothing could be more instructive in this connection than to observe that Aristotle, identi-


‘We speak in the singular of The Universe, of Nature, of Φύσις which can be translated as Process. There is the one all-embracing fact which is the advancing history of the one Universe. This community of the world, which is the matrix for all begetting, and whose essence is process with retention of connectedness,—this community is what Plato terms the Receptacle (ὑποδοχή). In our effort to divine his meaning, we must remember that Plato says that it is an obscure and difficult concept, and that in its own essence the Receptacle is devoid of all forms. It is thus certainly not the ordinary geometrical space with its mathematical relations. Plato calls his Receptacle ‘The foster-mother of all becoming’. He evidently conceived it as a necessary notion without which our analysis of Nature is defective. It is dangerous to neglect Plato’s intuitions. He carefully varies his phrases in referring to it, and implies that what he says is to be taken in its most abstract sense. The Receptacle imposes a common relationship on all that happens, but does not impose what that relationship shall be. It seems to be a somewhat more subtle notion than Aristotle’s “matter” which, of course, is not the “matter” of Galileo and Newton. Plato’s Receptacle may be conceived as the necessary community within which the course of history is set, in abstraction from all the particular historical facts. I have directed attention to Plato’s doctrine of The Receptacle because, at the present moment, physical science is nearer to it than at any period since Plato’s death. The space-time of modern mathematical physics, conceived in abstraction from the particular mathematical formulae which applies to the happenings in it, is almost exactly Plato’s Receptacle. It is to be noted that mathematical physicists are extremely uncertain as to what these formulae are exactly, nor do they believe that any such formulae can be derived from the mere notion of space-time. Thus, as Plato declares, space-time in itself is bare of all forms.’

11) Op. cit., p. 147. ‘Both for Plato and for Aristotle the process of the actual world has been conceived as a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing. Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of order establishing a cosmic epoch. It is not the beginning of matter of fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order.’

fying Platonic χώρα with ‘matter,’ applied to it again the term ‘the participant’ (τὸ μεταλητικόν, τὸ μεθαλητικόν) in relation to the Forms. For this would show that Aristotle was inevitably led, by his basic metaphysics of the individual particular (τὸ δὲ τί) and the material substrate, to ignore all the above-mentioned points of Plato’s conception of χώρα and to reintroduce automatically into that conception the ‘x’ (=τὸ δὲ τί, τοῦτο) as the subject-substrate and, with it, reinstate the discharged μετέχειν-terminology in its former office of describing the relation to the Forms. Furthermore, his supposition that, if the participant is place, the Forms themselves must be in place, clearly indicates that Aristotle took this locution, “Space participates in Φ”, which is itself an unwarranted, non-Platonic locution, to mean “Φ is in Space” (which is equivalent to “Space has (ἐχεῖ) Φ”), and that he did not take any account of F, likeness or image of Φ, which Plato says is what in fact enters into the Space.

Whereas they say that the problem of individuation was initially discovered and solved by Aristotle, according to Fujisawa, Plato was consistently pursuing to question the ultimate status of ‘x’ and to elaborate the logic of “Paradeigmatism” that points to the “final answer” in the Timaeus which will be summarized as follows:

(1) Plato intended to dissolve “this some-thing” x, which had been figuring as the subject of the ‘participation’ terminology.
(2) His efforts bore fruit at the passage dealing with the Receptacle of all becoming which is finally called “Space” (χώρα).
(3) Plato rejected finally both of the view of the physical world as a realm of subsisting things and of the locution using “this thing” (τοῦτο, τὸ δὲ τί) as its subject;
(4) As an alternative to “μετέχειν” locution he recommended the way of speaking of the phenomena in terms of F and Φ (and Space), without referring to x.

14) I sum the eight points, which Fujisawa displays up succinctly, and condense into four items.
15) It is noteworthy that Fujisawa insists that even in the middle period Plato thought that ‘x’ is something to be dissolved in the final analysis. He says:

‘Yet we must firmly bear in mind that this distinction, namely the distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘quality’, ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’, x (or Fx) and F, cannot, even in the Phaedo, have ultimate and fundamental significance for Plato’s theory, just because ‘x’ is something to be dissolved in the final analysis. The distinction which is and will remain ultimate and fundamental in Plato’s theory is, of course, the distinction between F and Φ. And if so, the way of description which is and will remain fundamental in Plato’s theory must be the one which, without mentioning ‘x’ as the subject-thing-substance, just
Thus, according to Fujisawa, the locution “This (x) is beautiful (F)” in everyday language would be in a “philosopher’s version” equivalent to that “In this part of Space the Form of Beauty (\(\Phi\)) is imaged (F),” or “An image (F) of the Form of Beauty (\(\Phi\)) has now come into this part of Space”, or, further, “This part of Space has now received an image (F) of the Form of Beauty (\(\Phi\))”, and so on according as the images (\(\mu\mu\eta\mu\tau\alpha\)) come into Space. But, it is not the case that Forms themselves come into Space.

‘While using such expressions as “receive” (δέχεσθαι) and “enter or come into” (εισέναι, ἐγγίνεσθαι),’ Fujisawa says, ‘Plato is emphatic in asserting that the Form and the Space, the two permanent separate kinds of being, cannot be one in the other and therefore what “comes into” Space or what Space “receives” is not \(\Phi\) itself but \(F\), an image or likeness of the Form, which, owing to the Space, can “somehow cling to existence” as \(\delta\nu \pi\omega\zeta\) and escape being nothing at all (\(\pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\zeta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\nu\).’

The above mentioned Fujisawa’s contention might be considered to have some issues to be examined carefully.16 And a part of the problem has its essential relevance to the matter which Whitehead called “the final platonic problem.”17 Nevertheless, Fujisawa’s contention has its own weight. Namely, it has its relevance to “the problem of Value and its relation to Being,” because of a fact that “‘this thing” as subject-substrate, \(x\), is in itself axiologically “neutral” and hence to hold such \(x\)s in some form or other to be ultimate factors in the world would seem to exclude

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16 Once I myself criticized a part of Fujisawa’s contention dealing with “μετέχων” locution and the problem concerning the specification of “this part” in the sentence of “Philosopher’s version” such as ‘In this part of Space the Form of Beauty (\(\Phi\)) is imaged (F),’ immediately after when Phronesis article made its appearance. See Fujisawa’s note in the last part of his Japanese version of his paper ‘”Εχθω, Μετέχω.”

17 Whitehead in Process and Reality, p. 52 says as follows:

‘Interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation. Such philosophies must include the notion of “illusion” as a fundamental principle—the notion of “mere appearance.” This is the final platonic problem.’

However, it is a noteworthy fact that Fujisawa criticizes Whitehead in Process and Reality who regarded Plato as a conspirator of Descartes and insisted that:

‘The exclusive dominance of the substance-quality metaphysics was enormously promoted by the logical bias of the mediaeval period. It was retarded by the study of Plato and of Aristotle. These authors included the strains of thought which issued in this doctrine, but included them inconsistently mingled with other notions. The substance-quality metaphysics triumphed with exclusive dominance in Descartes’ doctrines.’

values from the basic reality in the world and dissociate Being from Value.’

Now, as you may appreciate immediately, Fujisawa here is referring to a fact that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics* criticized severely Plato’s conception of the “Form of Good” resulting in the decisive dissociation between Being and Value.

**III**

By the way, it is an interesting fact that Fujisawa has shared his concern for the problem of “Value” and its relation to “Being” with Whitehead. Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* accused ‘the fixed scientific cosmology’ which presupposed ‘the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations.’ He said:

‘In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being. It is this assumption that I call “scientific materialism.” Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation ...’

For Whitehead the problem in question had its relevance to the “immediate experience” on which the Philosophy of Organism must be based.

‘Our datum is the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world spreads itself for observation in the guise of the topic of our “immediate experience. The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience.”

Here on this junction I want to turn to another Japanese philosopher Nishida. The central idea pervading throughout his first book *An Inquiry into the Good* was “pure experience,” which straightforwardly corresponds to Whitehead’s “immediate experience” and which Nishida called in the preface to the first edition “the ground of my thought,” i.e., ‘the starting point from which his ideas developed and the point to which every development, both his individual ideas and his thought as a whole, returns.” For Nishida too the “pure” experience was the aboriginal starting

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point of his philosophy:  

‘When one experiences directly one’s conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object are completely united. This is the purest form of experience.’

Now, it is significant to appreciate that even in this maiden work Nishida, though it was still in a primordial way, had already a foreseeing idea of “topos” which will be fully developed and bear fruit in his later works beginning from his monumental work ‘Basho’ (topos). In respect of this, Nishitani Keiji, an important disciple and successor of Nishida, epitomized the points as follows:

‘In short, facts, the knowledge of facts, and the actual presence of the self all become immediately one in [pure] experience. ... It is from the locus of pure experience that the standpoint develops at which true knowing, true reality, and true goodness appear in their original form and at which they can be examined with appreciation. Moreover, it is also the standpoint that leads to unity with God.’ ... This kind of intuitive experience forms the foundation on which all of our knowledge must be built up.’

The pass to Plato’s “χώρα” was, indeed, already at his close quarters, in the notion of “pure experience;” that is, in “the ground” of Nishida’s thought. The idea of “basho” (topos) came to him when he was struggling to overcome the epistemological stance dwelled on the “subject-object” split. His fundamental intuition, that bore fruit in his monumental paper “Basho” in June 1926, came from his attention to Plato’s conception of the “third kind” in the Timaeus (52b), where he read the sentence that ‘it is somehow necessary that all that exist should exist “in

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25) ‘The book opens with the sentence, “To experience means to know facts just as they are.” These words express aptly the essence of [pure] experience. The term “facts as they are” means that [pure] experience is the locus where facts are given most immediately, while “knowing facts as they are” means that [pure] experience is the locus where knowing arises most immediately. Or we might say that [pure] experience is the fountainhead for both the objectivity of facts as they are and the certainty of knowing what there is to know. The two come together most immediately in [pure] experience, at the point where facts are “as they are.” If we refer to the unity of the objectivity of facts and the certainty of knowing as “facticity,” then “as they are” is the locus of the most immediate facticity.’ Cf. Nishitani Keiji, Nishida Kitarō, Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku & James W. Heisig, Introduction by D. S. Clarke, Jr., University of California Press, 1991, pp. 95ff. The letters within [ ] are my own.
some place” (ἐν τῷ τόπῳ) and occupying “some space” (χώραν τινά)’ (52b).\(^{20}\) However, it is a noteworthy fact that the “basho” was for Nishida, above all, a topological metaphor for the workings of the subsumptive function of consciousness.\(^{27}\)

As early as 1905, when he was 26 years old, Nishida had been interested in the philosophical discussion revolving around “pure experience” led by William James and later Henri Bergson.\(^ {28}\)

And four years later, in July 1909, Nishida published “God and the World,”\(^ {29}\) the gist of which remind us vividly Whitehead’s sayings about the relation between God and the world. In reality, Nishida in this essay views God’s nature from the unified standpoint of “pure experience” as though he were Whitehead in *Process and Reality*, who did not regard “mind” and “matter” as two independent substances but explained them just as two poles of the same “actual entity”\(^ {30}\) and willingly took part in Bergson, William James, and John Dewy.\(^ {31}\)

And in later years, when *The Third Philosophical Essays* was published, Nishida in its preface, looking back to his own philosophical achievement, said as follows:\(^ {32}\)

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26) Nishida adopted a Japanese word “basho” to designate Plato’s “τόπος,” which is said to receive the images of the Form with some qualifications. It is notable however that Nishida says that ‘what I call “basho” is of course not identical with Plato’s “Khora,” “receptacle,” and so forth.

27) In his letter to Mutai Risaku, he explained his aim of the article ‘Basho’:

‘This essay, “Basho,” is not yet clear, but what I endeavored to do was to define consciousness logically as “that which becomes the grammatical predicate and not the grammatical subject” over against Aristotle’s definition of “substance,” ... while the grammatical subject, in its transcendence, endlessly moves in the direction of the particular, the grammatical predicate, in its transcendence, endlessly moves in the direction of the universal. When the latter direction becomes identical with the universal, we arrive at “nothingness” that embraces being, that which purely mirrors, or that which is material and yet contains what Plotinus called “the One” (τὸ ίδεῖν). When the grammatical predicate transcends itself to the infinite maximum limit and loses itself, the grammatical subject reaches the apex of particularity and becomes that which sees it in itself. ... Unfortunately, in the present paper I did not expound on these ideas in detail. Anyway, with the idea of the *topos* I feel I have reached the philosophical goal that I have been groping for. I shall try to reconstruct my previous ideas from the perspective of “basho”.

The above quoted sentence refers to Plotinus’ “τὸ ἐν.” Though it might arouse our interest somehow, here I want to note another fact that Nishida’s conception of “basho” was motivated by his initial interest to “pure experience.” See Yusa Michiko, *Zen & Philosophy*, An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō, University of Hawai’i Press, 2002, p. 205.


29) The content of this essay was later incorporated into the chapter 4 of the *Zen no Konkyū* (An Inquiry into the Good), the maiden work of Nishida.


31) Except for many reference to Bergson and William James, Whitehead in his ‘Preface’ of the *Process and Reality* expresses his indebtedness to them and says: ‘I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewy. One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it.’

‘Since my first book, *An Inquiry into the Good* [1911], my aim has been to approach things from the most immediate and most fundamental standpoint [“pure experience”], and my goal has been to capture this standpoint, from which everything emerges and to which everything returns. ... I grappled with this problem until I found a clue in my essay, “Basho (τόπος)” [1926]. [Initially] I was guided by Aristotle’s conception of the “ἀποκειμένον.” However, Aristotle’s logic, where the grammatical subject holds the central place, cannot deal with the reality of the self. ...The self, as the unifier of consciousness, can be conceived as the self-determination of the field of consciousness [= the judging universal] “topologically.” ... [Yet] when we consider even the universal itself to be topological, there must be something that transcends the universal itself. ... But the most fundamental and comprehensive universal, from which everything emerges and to which everything returns, is something like the “expressive universal.” ... [Thus] in contrast to Aristotle’s logic of the grammatical subject or Kant’s objective logic, I thought about the most fundamental and concrete universal, one that can also explain the activities of the self. But the universal that allows that which is thoroughly individual to be conceivable is the universal in which the many and the one are contradictorily self-identical, that is, it must be “the dialectical universal.” ... What I earlier called the “*topos*” is this dialectical universal; it is the world of contradictory self-identity. [I call this “Nothingness (無 Mu).”] ... From this perspective, all that exists is “being” and “non-being” at the same time. “Absolute Nothingness” is that which is totally transcendent of everything and yet that by which everything is established. The world that fashions itself as the self-determination of this dialectical universal is the world that fashions itself historically and socially—the world from which our self is born and to which it returns.

IV

Nishida’s remark on the “dialectical universal” and the “Absolute Nothingness” in the above quoted last sentence may be taken as a bluff which startles us by its singular appearance. But, the idea at the back of these words, I surmise, shares something important with Whitehead’s conception of “God.” In the *Process and Reality*, Part V, Chapter II, Section III, Whitehead said: ‘God, as well as being primordial, is also consequent. He is the beginning and the end.’

33) In Section V, Whitehead speaks about the relation between God and the world as follows (Op. cit., p. 523):

‘It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent.
It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is One and God many.
It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison
God and the World are, according to Whitehead, ‘the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity achieves its Supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast.’

Thus he says: ‘The concept of “God” is the way in which we understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is.’

The “Supreme task” that Whitehead attributes to the “Creativity” is “that what cannot be,” that is, “contradictory,” yet is “credible.” Thus the Whiteheadian “Creativity” is something like Nishidian “Absolute Nothingness” as the “dialectical universal,” that is, the “topos” which is totally transcendent of everything and yet that by which everything is established.

Now, we may safely say that such an affinity between East and West philosophers’ thoughts was derived respectively from a common fact that both of them were, of course independently from one another, encouraged and guided by Plato’s conception of “the third kind.”

Thus inspired by Plato’s original insights, especially by the conception of “topos,” A. N. Whitehead and two Japanese philosophers, Nishida Kitarō and Fujisawa Norio, though separately from each other and in different ways, yet shared with similar and productive thought, which may be regarded as the powerful cheer to their companions who are groping for the matrix of Truth, Good and Beauty, i.e., the light illuminating whereabouts of our well-being in this global era.

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with God, the World is actual eminently.
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.
It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.’


36) Nevertheless, of course, the fact does not mean that these philosophers had a rigidly same idea of ‘place.’ Concerning Whitehead, I think, we should pay attention to the Aristotelian aspect of the “extensive continuum” of which Fujisawa somehow suspected. In chapter II of the Part II in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead distinguished between the ‘general’ potentiality and the ‘real’ potentiality and explained these as follows:

(a) the “general” potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually consistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and

(b) the “real” potentiality, which is conditioned by the data provided by the actual world. General potentiality is absolute, and real potentiality is relative to some actual entity, taken as a standpoint whereby the actual world is defined (p. 102).’

According to Whiteheadian original conception, the former corresponds to Plato’s Forms and the latter Plato’s “receptacle” or “space.” But, it is obvious that this is in reality an eclectic amalgam derived from both of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thoughts.
A. N. Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism is a typical case which testifies a fact that Plato's conception in the Timaeus has still an extraordinary power to provoke the modern intellects into building their great metaphysical theories. In this paper I want to show you a fact that Japanese philosophers Nishida Kitarō and Fujisawa Norio too were enlightened by Plato's insight. They too, being encouraged and guided by Plato's conception of "χώρα," developed their original ideas. Fujisawa presented a fresh interpretation of Plato's later philosophy; and Nishida, a contemporary of Whitehead, developed a bold metaphysical viewpoint which might be regarded as an achievement ranking with M. Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Whitehead and two Japanese philosophers, Nishida Kitarō and Fujisawa Norio, though separately from each other and in different ways, shared with similar and productive thought, which may be regarded as the powerful cheer to their companions who are groping for the matrix of Truth, Good and Beauty, i.e., the light illuminating whereabouts of our well-being in this global era.