The Origin of Cosmopolitanism

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I PROLOGUE

Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412/403-324/321 B.C.), the famous dog philosopher, was not only the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity, but also the first protagonist of cosmopolitanism. Declaring himself an "ἀοικος" (homeless), an "ἀπολις" (without city), and a "κοσμοπολίτης" (citizen of the universe), Diogenes began to preach his “cosmopolitanism" at a time when the traditional world of polis was beginning to be shaken to its foundation and collapse.

It was indeed the time when Macedonian men of power were assuming the hegemony of Mediterranean world. And before long, according to Plutarch in De Fortuna Alexandri, having sympathy with Zeno of Citium’s cosmopolitanism and realizing himself as a “universal divine governor and reconciler of the all things,” Alexander the great began to move ahead with his cosmopolitanism in arms, whose all-inclusive and paradigmatic influences reminds us strongly the progression and the prevalence of globalization and its various problematic effects in our era.

Now, it is a noteworthy fact that even at the initial stage of its appearance there were two prominent and antithetically different types of cosmopolitanism; the one originating from Diogenes of Sinope and the other from Alexander the great respectively. However, in comparison with the strong legacy of Alexander the great, which has been incessantly transmitted through the tradition of the Roman empire and the Catholic church, the saying and thought of Diogenes have been so often ignored or underestimated that his cosmopolitanism also has been too disdainfully neglected and not always been appropriately estimated. Thus, whenever one
speaks about Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, he/she often misunderstands it and immediately regards it as a shadowy ghost of Alexander. Thus, according to Dudley, “it is essential not to read too much into” Diogenes’ profession that “I am a citizen of the world (κοσμοπολίτης).”

However, in this paper, following Diogenes’ mission “παραχαράτ-τειν τὸ νόμισμα” (defacing the currency) I want to deface this even now prevalent and current interpretation and turn up some significant aspects of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, which may be helpful to discern and cope with the complicated problems in our global era.

II SYNOPTIC SURVEY

When Diogenes of Sinope answered somebody’s ridiculous question “Where did you come from?” with the word “κοσμοπολίτης” ([I am]a citizen of the cosmos) and when at another opportunity concerning the same topic he insisted that “μόνην τε ὁρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ (the only true government is that which is in the cosmos), what idea of the πολιτεία (government) did he have? Was his answer only negative and one of sour grapes? Or was he suggesting some positive ideas, which might prepare for the appearance of the κοσμόπολις (cosmopolis—the state in universe; the universal state; the universal government), where all human beings were fellow citizens and could attain their freedom and happiness, even if Diogenes himself was never a historical author of Republic, based on which Zeno of Citium developed his own cosmopolitanism, and which has been identified as a book conveying a proto-Cynic utopian thought?

I believe that Diogenes’ answer gives countenance to the latter
view. But if it does, the case demands us to investigate whether his cosmopolitanism has any practical or positive significance in order to discern and cope with the problems resulted from the progress of globalization in our era.

Now, according to my assessment of the reports and testimonia, Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism is not only a parody of Plato’s Republic, but also stands sharply against Aristotelian conception of “the political animal” in the Politics, whereas Diogenes’ mission on the “defacing the currency” of all things, has to be linked with a way of life originated in Socrates, who lived in Athenian society as though he was a “stranger” and carried through his position as a “private man” (ἰδιωτής) standing outside the public affairs (δημόσιος).

From such a viewpoint, it may be said that the substance of Diogenes’ conception of the cosmopolis has, though it may appear to be contrary to the general expectations, an intrinsic affinity to Jesus Christ’s “Kingdom of God.” Therefore his cosmopolitanism too should be clearly distinguished from Alexander’s “cosmopolitanism in arms,” which is an archetype of “the globalism” going unchallenged under the name of Pax Americana and being prevalent in our contemporary world.

III AGAINST ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF “POLITICAL ANIMAL”

Diogenes Laertius abundantly depicts the figure of Diogenes of Sinope as a person who is in opposition to Plato and his theory of Forms, whereas he never refers to Aristotle. However the fact is apt to mask another fact that Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism can be fully appreciated within the framework of his antagonism to Aristotle’s
conception of “the political animal.”

It is a well-known fact that Aristotle in the opening part of Politics, reforming and sharpening the traditional Greek view of “man” beginning from Hesiod gave a famous definition of “man” as “a political animal by nature” which can be identified as a proportional mean between “god” and “animal” as follows:

\[
god : man = man : animal.
\]

In accordance with this definition, Aristotle denounced “a man who by nature and not by mere accident is without a city-state (ἀπολις)” as well as who is “unable to live in society” or “has no need because he is sufficient for himself.” He identified such a man as either “a bad man” or “a beast (θηρίον)”. For such a man is, according to Aristotle, “no part of a city-state” and is like the “tribeless, lawless, hearthless one (ἁφρίτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἄνεστιος),” whom Homer reviled in the Iliad IX. 63. It is a noteworthy fact that Aristotle, in his quotation of the Homeric passage, where Nestor is discouraging Diomedes from causing civil strife, is expressing his distrust of the cityless man and the outsider who may be characterized as “beast” and no part of a city-state.

Now it is proper to remember here a famous episode, in which Diogenes defines himself as a homeless who suffered all the curses of tragedy: “ἀπολις, ἀοικος, πατρίδος ἑστερημένος, πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίου ἔχων τούφ’ ἡμέραν (without a city-state, without a house, without a fatherland, a beggar, a wanderer with a single day’s bread).” Diogenes was in fact a homeless who was looked at suspiciously by Aristotle. In addition to this, it is very significant that he recognized himself as a “beast” like lion inspiring a person with awe and as a “dog” fawning on those who give him something, yelping at those who refuse, and setting his teeth in rascals. Thus, it
seems to have been his own case that Diogenes, in his conscious antagonism to Aristotelian world-view, dared voluntarily to substitute himself for "animal," which was the third term in the above mentioned Aristotelian analogy: \( \text{god} : \text{man} = \text{man} : \text{animal} \). 

Of course, behind the above mentioned fact, there was Diogenes’ personal experience of spiritual awakening, which Theophrastos in *The Megarian* described: “Through watching a mouse running about, ... not looking for a place to lie down in, not afraid of the dark, not seeking any of the things which are considered to be dainties, he discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances.”

Namely, Diogenes discerned in animals the best model of the self-sufficiency (\( \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \rho \kappa \varepsilon \alpha \)). This position of animalism, which Diogenes himself voluntarily accepted, is resonant with Crates’ following words too:

> “Far from heap ing up fabulous wealth, I crave for my only affluence the happiness of the dung beetle, the riches of the ant.”

Now, according to Aristotle, “a man who has no need because he is sufficient for himself” has substantially to be “a god.” Then, the Aristotelian *analogia*:

\[ \text{god} : \text{man} = \text{man} : \text{animal}, \]

which has been circulated as the Current Coin (\( \tau \delta \nu \omicron \omicron \mu \omicron \alpha \)) in that time, was not only to be defaced (\( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \chi \alpha \rho \alpha \tau \tau \tau \varepsilon \iota \nu \)) into a reformed analogy

\[ \text{god} : \text{animal} = \text{animal} : \text{man}, \]

but also “god” and “animal” themselves had to be counted as inherently congenial and substantially equivalent with each other, so that on the assumption that he is a wise dog, Diogenes could justify his
mendicancy utilizing Aristotelian syllogism mockingly and declare:

All things belong to the gods.
The wise are friends of the gods.
Friends hold things in common.
Therefore, all things belong to the wise.

It is a significant fact that in line with the same idea Ps.-Lucian could insist that even the gods should have been regarded as being inferior to the animals and Onesicritus could contemplate abolishing the slavery and war.

Diogenes rejected the ownership of slaves. He refused to inquire the whereabouts of Manes the runaway slave. And when he was on a voyage to Aegina, he himself was captured by pirates under the command of Scirpalus, and having been put up for sale as a slave and forbidden to sit down, he shouted: “οὐδὲν διαφέρει καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἱχθὺς ὄπως κέουιτο πιπράσκεσθαι (It makes no difference, for in whatever position fishes lie, they still find purchasers).” I take this as a knockdown blow against the current realities of slavery. And it was also, as a matter of course, the blow against Aristotle’s defense of the slavery.

Aristotle in Politics criticized the view that which might be regarded as an antithesis against him presented by Diogenes and which insisted that “the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature... and the distinction between slave and free man exists by law only, and not by nature” and developed a lengthy defense of slavery as follows:

“It is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the
mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good with animals in relation to men; ... Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind ... Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sorts are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; ... It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.”

In order to defend the slavery, Aristotle in the above quoted passage relied upon the naturalness of distinction between men and animal, which ran parallel to the distinction between soul and body. But its validity i.e. currency was now dramatically rejected by the dog philosopher. Thus, the Aristotelian world-view will be put out of circulation, so that finally, as the dying Diogenes predicted, the bottom will be converted into the top.
THE LEGEND OF ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΜΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ

The above-mentioned episode reported by Eubulus should be seen in a close connection with the famous episode of “παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα” (defacing the currency). It is obvious that both episodes go side by side. In the case of “παραχαράττειν” episode, the νόμισμα A in circulation is defaced and transformed into the unavailable νόμισμα B. This process can be regarded as a change from ἀνω to κάτω. And in the case of Diogenes’ last word episode, the unavailable κάτω is transformed into the ἀνω in circulation. This process can be regarded as a transformation of the unavailable νόμισμα B into the νόμισμα A in circulation.


\[
\begin{align*}
\text{νόμισμα A} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{παραχαράττειν} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{νόμισμα B} \\
\text{(in circulation)} & \quad & \text{(out of circulation)} \\
\text{[ἀνω]} & \quad & \text{[κάτω]} \\
\text{κάτω} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{στρέφεσθαι} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{ἀνω} \\
\text{(out of circulation)} & \quad & \text{(in circulation)} \\
\text{[νόμισμα B]} & \quad & \text{[νόμισμα A]}
\end{align*}
\]

In brief such was the core meaning of the “defacing the currency,” by the medium of which Diogenes challenged to deface the self-righteous and false values of the dominant culture and denounced their validity of currency (νόμισμα).

If this is the core meaning of Diogenes’ mission “παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα” which Apollo gave him, we find it easier to learn why Plato gave Diogenes a nickname “Σωκράτης μαίνομενος”

Of course, the Plato in DL is chronologically unlikely to be the historical one. But we can imagine the situation, whereat the Plato was
plausibly intending to convey by the word "the madden Socrates." Well, then, what kind of Socrates was Plato able to imagine? It is, I surmise, a fellow like that Socrates making his appearance in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.

There, the Socrates comes on the stage suspended above in the basket and denies flatly the currency (\(\nu\omicron\omicron\mu\omicron\omicron\alpha\)) of "gods" in the traditional world of Greek religion. The Socrates in the *Clouds* teaches Pheidippides the son of Strepsiades that "the established \(\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\omicron\)" are worthless and can be altered at will. That is, the Socrates in the *Clouds* is a sophist, who denounces the currency of all of the traditional convention (\(\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\omicron\)).

There is no gainsaying that this malicious image of the Socrates strongly reminds us of the figure of Diogenes the dog. The fellow like this was "the madden Socrates" for Plato, that is, a distorted and abnormal image of the historical Socrates, i.e. a caricature of true philosopher.

However, a caricature is of the real facts; thus according to A. E. Taylor, "we should be foolish not to ask ourselves what are the real facts which explain the caricature, and whether we cannot discern them reappearing from a different angle of vision."

I think I can discern in this caricature the philosophical activity of historical Socrates as a \(\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\psi\) "(gadfly) attached to the city-state Athens, especially his activity of the \(\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\) (elenchus) against men who have a reputation for wisdom, which the famous Delphic oracle urged him to begin, a substantial fact corresponding to Diogenes' mission of defacing the currency."

Let us hear Socrates' words in *Apology*, which he speaks about his experience of *Elenchus* against men of reputation for wisdom; he says that "those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be
almost the most deficient, as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible."

The reputation in this context means “the good name in circulation” as well as “the current good name.” Socrates disclosed that the “currency (νόμισμα)” is deceptive. Thus, he defaced “those who had the most reputation” and transformed them into “the most deficient.” So that the substance of Socrates’ Elenchus was nothing other than a kind of “παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα.”

Here, I want to point out another stamp of Socrates, which immediately remind us of Diogenes the homeless. Athenians viewed Socrates as an atopotatatos person who appears like a “stranger” (ξένος); and he himself consciously carried through his political position as a “private man” (διώτης) who stands outside the public affairs (δημόσιος). These facts, it is notable, correspond exactly to Diogenes’ case. Thus, both philosophers’ ways of life were so similar to each other, that there is nothing to be wondered at in the fact that Plato gave Diogenes a nickname “Σωκράτης μαυρόμενος.” Therefore, it may be said also that there is no puzzle in the fact that Socrates and Diogenes were regarded as ubiquitous duo in the Socratic tradition, even if we might disregard the problem of the historical relation between Antisthenes and Diogenes.

However, I surmise, Plato might have discerned clearly the essential difference between both persons too. The one philosophized as an “ἀπολιος,” whereas the other philosophized as a person who clung to “πόλις.” That is to say, on the one hand Diogenes, when someone reproached with his exile, replied: “Nay, it was through that, you miserable fellow, that I began to philosophize.” On the other hand, Socrates in Plato’s Crito was a patriot and had a strong affection for...
Athens, so that he could not bring himself to part a single day from his beloved Athens. Thus Socrates declines the opportunity, which Crito is offering him to escape. Under the name of the laws of Athens, he asks himself and Crito who is desperately talking him into breaking prison:

“He who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilized men? And if you do this will your life be worthy of living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men?”

The only one thing worthy of discussion was, for Socrates, how we can accomplish to live well (τὸ εὖ ζην). And the subject “to live well” was, for Socrates, utterly unconceivable without its relevance to justice and the laws of Athens, wherein he was born, nurtured and educated. Thus, it might be the case that Socrates’ conception of justice is not always universal. Its validity seems to have remained in the framework of his beloved Athens. Hence also his thought might be irrelevant to the cosmopolitanism.

However, is this Socrates the same person as that Socrates in Apology, who was going about, searching and at the god’s behest investigating anyone, whether citizen or foreigner (καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων)? And is this Socrates, who rejects jail breaking because of his prospect of the inability to discuss about virtue and justice and lawful things, the same person as that Socrates in Apol-
ogy, who presumed the case of exile as his own penalty, and who spoke as follows:

“[if I were exiled from Athens,] a fine life I should lead ... wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here (ἐὕ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι, ὅποι ἀν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἄκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὀσπέρ ἐνθάδε)’”

Thus speaking that “well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here,” Socrates in Apology makes it an *ipso fact* that his philosophical activity is universally valid; therefore virtues themselves also are universal and do not have frontiers. Or was Phaedo’s commenting word on Socrates “the most righteous man” (δικαιότατος) in the end of the dialogue Phaedo only a currency (νόμισμα) of Athens, notwithstanding the patent fact that Phaedo the commentator himself was a foreigner, a native of Elis and a companion of Socrates?

No, it is not the case. Socrates’ declination of jail breaking in Crito is not because of his patriotism, but mainly because of his deliberation of a discordant and disreputable situation, where a person who has obeyed the laws of fatherland turns suddenly his face into a shameless destroyer of them. The laws in Crito say as follows:

“You are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us.”

As the context in Crito tells us, if Socrates wished to be exiled he
might have offered exile as his penalty, though in reality he did not. But, suppose a case where the official penalty proposed by Meletus against Socrates was originally “exile.” In such a case, whether he liked it or not Socrates eventually would have to be exiled from Athens.

Then, he would have been necessitated to become an “ἀπολισ, ἀοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος” wandering from city to city. Nevertheless, as an “ἰδιώτης” he could have continued to exhort and convey his philosophical mission of “τὸ εὖ ζῆν,” ”urging and reproaching each one” of foreigners “everywhere the whole day long,” albeit he were separated from the domain of “Δημόσιος.” For the world of “τὰ Ἰδια,” is a public space, which may be regarded as a kind of Husserlian Lebenswelt, and which is principally opened for all individuals in the state, and has no frontiers.

Socrates lived in such a public space, from where the new cosmopolitanism would begin to make its appearance. Indeed, according to Epictetus, Socrates himself was already a cosmic man (κόσμιος), who when asked to what country he belonged, neither said “I am an Athenian” nor “I am a Corinthian” but “I am a citizen of the universe.” Socrates and Diogenes were, for Epictetus, the very counterparts of each other.

Thus, the loop connecting Socrates and Diogenes was completed.

V DIOGENES VERSUS JESUS CHRIST

Now, it is time to examine and specify the fundamental character of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism.

It is to be greatly appreciated that John L. Mole’s recent achievement ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’ gave us once again an oppor-
tunity to discuss on this topic positively. He gave five proofs to show that Cynic cosmopolitanism had positive implications and presented an outline of Cynic cosmological view as follows:

"The cosmos consists of the earth and heavens; on the earth, there is both animate and inanimate nature; animate nature consists of human beings and animals; human beings consist of Cynics and non-Cynics, Greeks and barbarians, men and women; the heavens contain the heavenly bodies and the gods who live in them."

Presupposing this cosmological matrix he went on to confirm that the early Cynics [especially Diogenes and Crates] expressed (1) a positive allegiance to the whole earth and all mankind and (2) a positive attitude to the natural world and all its riches as opposed to the world of polis, therefore also (3) a positive attitude to the animal world and (4) recognized the kinship or community of the wise or "like-mindedness" (homonooia) and (5) considered that this kinship transcends the conventional barriers between men and women and between the races, (6) so that they recognized "friendship" and "affinity" between the animate and the inanimate and between gods and men so as to recognize the common humanity.

Thus concluding John L. Mole referred to the problem of originality of Cynic cosmopolitanism and insisted as follows:

"On my interpretation, Cynic cosmopolitanism influenced Stoic cosmopolitanism far more than current opinion recognizes. The Cynics did not bequeath to the Stoics a purely negative concept to which the latter added a positive value: rather, Cynic cosmo-
politianism already contained all the essential positive qualities that the Stoics endowed with a fuller exposition, and that they integrated into a fully developed physical system."

So far on the whole I feel sympathy with his position. But, I do not accept his justification of Diogenes' cosmopolitanism appealing to Plutarch's *On the fortune of Alexander*, which runs for example as follows:

"Like the Cynic, he [Alexander] is sent by the gods; like the Cynic, he is a governor of men; like the Cynic, he is governor of all men; like the Cynic, he is a reconciler... and he is reconciler not only of men, but also *tón holón*: that is to say, of everything that exists—the whole earth, the cosmos, men, and gods."

This is, I think, a problematic thesis. Now, in order to settle the matter, let me return to that scene of dialogue between Diogenes the slave and his master Xeniades. There, in his response to the master's question how he wishes to be buried, Diogenes the dying slave answered: "On my face" (ἐπὶ πρόσωπον); and asked again its meaning he uttered: "οἵτι μετ' ὀλίγου μέλλει τὰ κάτω ἄνω στρέφεσθαι" (since after a little time the things at the bottom will be converted into up).

Considering why the dog uttered the phrase in question, Diogenes Laertius explained: "because the Macedonians had now got the supremacy, that is, had risen high from a humble position." But there is neither rhyme nor reason for his explanation. Almost every report about Diogenes portrays him as a thoroughgoing anti-authoritarian figure, especially in the episodes referring to Alexander and
Macedonians in power. The dog looks down his nose at the Macedonian men of power. He neither follows their hegemonies nor shrinks away with his tail between his legs.

Thus, his last word’s implication is that Diogenes who is now at the bottom will, after a little time, be exalted and received as a genuine member of "μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτεία ἐν κόσμῳ," where even the downtrodden people like beggars, wanderers, and slaves could enjoy their freedom and happiness.

By the way, Diogenes’ expression "ὅτι μετ’ ὀλίγων μέλλει τὰ κάτω ἄνω στρέφεσθαι" reminds us immediately Jesus Christ’s words in Mk. 10.31:

“πολλοὶ δὲ ἔσονται πρῶτοι ἐσχατοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐσχατοὶ πρῶτοι.”

(But many who are first will be last, and the last will be first.)

It is as plain as the sun that the phrase "τὰ κάτω ἄνω" in the former context precisely corresponds to the phrase "οἱ ἐσχατοὶ πρῶτοι" in the latter context. It is a notable fact that the similarity is detectable not only in their literal expressions but also in their behaviors and thoughts. In addition to this, we should also remark that Diogenes’ conception of the cosmopolis is strikingly similar to Jesus Christ’s “kingdom of God,” which Jesus in the Synoptic promise to people:

In Lk. 18.14, seeing the tax collector beating his breast and lamenting his sin Jesus says: “all who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who humble themselves will be exalted.”

In Lk. 6.20 Jesus declares: “Blessed are you who are beggars, for yours is the kingdom of God.”
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In *Mt. 21.31* Jesus teaches: "Truly I tell you, the tax collectors and the prostitutes are going into the kingdom of God ahead of you."

The resemblance between both persons' conceptions is straightforward. In addition to this, Jesus’ words on “the birds of the air” and “the lilies of the field” too remind us undoubtedly of Diogenes’ case; he too upheld animals and plants as models of his frugal life “according to nature.”

Where did the resemblance in question come from? According to Doyne Dawson, the origin of *Mk. 10.17-31* and the parallel passages in the other Synoptic Gospels is “one of the most perplexed” in the Gospels. Its tradition, Dawson says, “remained a troubling element which could never be entirely reconciled with the rest of the Gospel teaching,” unless the passages in question could be understood in reference to the contexts of *Acts 2.44-47* and *4.32-35*.

Namely, in these contexts of *Acts* we should, in the first place, discern a fact that the teachings of renunciation of property and generous almsgiving are described by the phrasings such as “πάντες δὲ οἱ πιστεύοντες ... εἶχον ἀπαντα κοινά” (“all who believed ... had all things in common,” *Acts 2.44*) or “οὐδὲ εἷς τι τῶν ύπαρχόντων αὐτῶ ἔλεγεν ἰδιόν εἶναι ἄλλα ἣν αὐτοῖς ἀπαντα κοινά” (no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common,” *Acts 4.32*), which originated from the pagan biographies of Pythagoras or the Cynic tradition, whereas “Luke or whoever compiled the passages in question might have been unaware of their pagan Greek philosophical origin.”

Why, then, did Mark and Luke see fit to describe Jesus' behaviors or Christian practices of almsgiving and renunciation of property in
terms derived from Greek philosophy?

Remember here Lucian's report on the Christians' attitude toward Peregrinus the Cynic who himself was a Christian for a time in his early life went over to Christianity and thrown into prison.

"When he had been imprisoned, the Christians, regarding the incident as a calamity, left nothing undone in the effort to rescue him. Then, as this was impossible, every other form of attention was shown him, not in any casual way but with assiduity; and from the very break of day aged widows and orphan children could be seen waiting near the prison, while their officials even slept inside with him after bribing the guards. Then elaborate meals were brought in, and sacred books of theirs were read aloud, and excellent Peregrinus—for he still went by that name—was called by them 'the new Socrates.'"

Referring to the above quoted passage D. R. Dudley insisted that this episode in Peregrinus' life is of especial interest, since it is recognized as "the earliest and best authenticated example of connection between the Cynics and the Christians." He said as follows:

"A priori there are obvious grounds of sympathy between the movements; the Jews, the Cynics, and the Christians were alike hostile to the general standards of Graeco-Roman civilization."

And Doyne Dawson said, paying his attention to the fact that Lucian regarded the Christians as a sect who "consider all things to be common," that
"There is no difficulty in the assumption that early Christianity was in some quarters open to Cynic influences" and refers to a fact that "the resemblance between Christian street preacher and Cynic street preacher was noticed by more than one pagan, and so was the similarity in their attitudes to property."

Therefore, in such a spiritual circumstance, I surmise, it is nothing to be wondered at that Jesus Christ, in some occasions, should have been identified with Diogenes the Cynic, since even Peregrinus was, as clearly as in the above quoted passage from Lucian, really regarded as a "new Socrates" and whom the Christians showed their original sympathies and "every other form of attention." In addition to this, we should mention a fact that both persons recognized themselves as homeless.

Thus, it is obvious that their orientations were fundamentally and decisively democratic and anti-authoritative. They were originally egalitarians. Their actions and ways of life were supported by such an egalitarian thought. Hence, it is beyond doubt that Diogenes' mission "defacing the currency" (παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα) too should be thoroughly construed in this line.

VI DIogenes versus Alexander the Great

From such a viewpoint, Alexander's cosmopolitanism appears to be an utterly authoritative and self-righteous. Therefore, it has to be decisively distinguished from Diogenes' cosmopolitan thought.

Alexander's cosmopolitan action was, according to Plutarch in his 
On the fortune of Alexander, a realization of "a dream" or "a shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth," which
Zeno of Citium depicted in his Republic. The gist of Zeno's cosmopolitanism, according to Plutarch, may be summed up in the following principles:

1. "All the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities."
2. "We should consider all men to be of one community and one polity."
3. "We should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field."

According to Plutarch, Alexander was a cosmopolitan philosopher-king in action, who gave effect to this Zeno's principles and "desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people," so that one law would govern all mankind, and they all would look toward one rule of justice (ἐν δίκαιον) as though toward a common source of light (κοινὸν φῶς).

By the way, it is a well-known fact that Zeno's Republic itself was written "on the dog's tail" when he was still a disciple of Crates the Cynic. Thus, John L. Moles insists that Alexander's cosmopolitanism is Zeno's cosmopolitanism in action; and without fail "Stoicism is Cynicism, even if enriched with numerous refinements," therefore Alexander's cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a legitimate successor of the Dog philosopher's cosmopolitan thought.

Is this interpretation acceptable? No, Alexander's cosmopolitanism depicted by Plutarch is, I believe, antithetically different from
Diogenes’ conception. Here I want to give some proofs of this.

First, concerning Alexander’s famous words in DL6.32 “Had I not been Alexander, I should have liked to be Diogenes,” Plutarch makes Alexander say: “And I also, like Diogenes, must alter the standard of coinage and stamp foreign states with the impress of Greek government.” The phrase “stamp foreign states with the impress of Greek government” is intolerably despotic and self-righteous, and so that betrays Diogenes’ real intention of “παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα” as I have explained in the above context so far, whereas the sentiment itself attributed to Alexander by Plutarch, though modified, may have its origin in Isocrates.

Second, depicting throughout the Macedonian conqueror as a philosopher-king who in his action (ἐργον) surpassed all other philosophers in words (λόγος) like Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, Plutarch justifies Alexander’s conquest as follows:

“Those who were vanquished by Alexander are happier than those who escaped his hand; for these had no one to put an end to the wretchedness of their existence, while the victor compelled those others to lead a happy life... Thus Alexander’s new subjects would not have been civilized, had they not been vanquished.”

It is obvious that this sentence too exhibits an extremely self-righteous attitude toward “those who were vanquished.” Try to substitute something like “Elgin marbles” for “those who were vanquished” in the above quoted sentence, and we could immediately suspect the self-righteousness of this sentence. The logic lurking behind this utterance is one of evildoer’s self-righteous audacities.
Third and finally, I am detecting a hidden dimension of Alexander’s cosmopolitanism. I am touching Alexander’s cosmopolitanism on the raw, i.e. his indebtedness to Aristotle. According to Plutarch in De Fortuna Alexandri, Alexander the great was never a faithful disciple of Aristotle. He closed consciously his ears against the great master’s advices. In conducting himself without regard to his great master’s political thought, Alexander could achieve a great thing. “Alexander,” Plutarch says, “did not follow Aristotle’s advice to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader, and other peoples as if he were their master.” Failing to meet his master’s expectations, as Plutarch recognizes, Alexander acknowledged that he was a “κοινὸς θεόθεν ἀρμοστής” (a heaven-sent universal governor) and a “διαλακτῆς τῶν ὀλίγων” (a mediator of all things): that is to say, a mediator between men and gods.”

Who is “a mediator (reconciler) between men and gods”? What is his logical status? Is it not a “mean proportional” between two extremes, namely a mean proportional between “men” and “gods”? Yes, he is. Indeed, Alexander identified his position in the world as a mean proportional between gods and men. Thus, as you may immediately suspect, the fact, without doubt, indicates another fact that Alexander faithfully inherited a vital point of Aristotle’s political thought. For Aristotle, as we have observed, identified the essence of “man” as a mean proportional between “god” and “animal.”

Thus paradoxically betraying Plutarch’s and public estimation, Alexander as a descendant of Achilles the hero in the Iliad was really a faithful disciple of Aristotle.

It is true that Alexander’s analogy

“god : Alexander = Alexander : man”

should be regarded as a version being considerably different from
Aristotelian analogy:

"god : man = man : animal."

But, the difference between them consists in the fact that the former is an extravagantly swollen-headed and paranoiac version of the latter.

The figure of Alexander depicted by Plutarch in the On the fortune of Alexander is not worthy of the name of paradigmatic cosmopolitan, according to which we should develop afresh our new cosmopolitanism, although Plutarch in the Parallel Lives gives a more complicated and suggestive figure of Alexander, from whose problematic behaviors we can learn.

VII LOGICAL SURVEY OF COSMOPOLITANISM

Now, I would like to develop another topic to make clear the interrelationship between the above-mentioned two types of cosmopolitanism. The topic has its relevance to the synoptic survey of the interrelationship between four types of cosmopolitanism, which is neatly expressible by the traditional square of opposition.

Let the vowels A, E, I, O symbolize respectively (1) the universal affirmative, (2) universal negative, (3) particular affirmative, (4) particular negative type of the categorical propositions; and let x and y be the variables for the domain of classes; then, the four types of the categorical propositions could be represented as follows:

| (A) Universal affirmative | Every x is y | Axy |
| (E) Universal negative    | No x is y   | Exy |
| (I) Particular affirmative| Some x is y | Ixy |
| (O) Particular negative   | Some x is not y | Oxy |
Then, the interrelationship between the above four categorical propositions can be depicted as follows:

1. $Axy$ and $Oxy$ can neither both be true nor both be false; $Axy$ is the negation of $Oxy$ and vice versa; similarly $Exy$ and $Ixy$ can neither both be true nor both be false; $Exy$ is the negation of $Ixy$ and vice versa; so that they are called *contradictories* to each other respectively;

2. $Axy$ and $Exy$ cannot both be true but may both be false; $Axy$ excludes $Exy$ and vice versa, so that they are called *contraries* to each other;

3. $Ixy$ and $Oxy$ may both be true but cannot both be false; they do not exclude each other, so that they are called *subcontraries* to each other;

4. Each of $Ixy$ and $Oxy$ are *subalterns* of $Axy$ and $Exy$ respectively; $Axy$ implies $Ixy$ and $Exy$ implies $Oxy$, only if “$x$” is not empty; the term “subaltern” refers to the existential statement.
The above diagram, which I drew in accordance with J. Venn's device, represents at the same time a matrix of the interrelationship between the above-mentioned four categorical propositions as well as the four types of cosmopolitanism.

Now, let me briefly show that this diagram is considerably useful to discriminate the interrelationship between different cosmopolitanisms. In a tentative way I would like to apply it to the famous persons in Roman period.

First, let me take up some typical cases of the type $A$. Then it becomes clear that the apparently different persons such as Marcus Aurelius, Ambrosius, Eusebius and Augustine, on my interpretation, belong to this type.

For a typical instance of this type, first, I would like to take up the case of Marcus Aurelius. Presupposing that the Universe ( = the universal state) ($y$) comprises his country Rome ($x$), Marcus Aurelius said as follows:

"My nature is rational and civic; my city and country, as Antoninus, is Rome; as a man, the Universe."

This is a typical expression that may be called an outburst of the sentiment of "the universal cosmopolitanism." Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor of the Roman Empire, lived in his country Rome; but Rome was, for him, only a small part of the Universe, which was for him the single and genuine common state, wherein the whole race of mankind could be "fellow-members."

Concerning Ambrosius' and Eusebius' cosmopolitanism expressed as Catholic credenta, I believe, there is no need to dwell on them. It
is obvious that their thoughts too belong to the same universal cosmopolitanism. However, in the case of Augustine, the situation is appreciably complicated. But, I think, because of this very complication his case can be regarded as a paradigm, by the medium of which the intricate aspects of different cosmopolitanisms may be neatly explained.

On my interpretation, Augustine’s standpoint may be identified with a case of “the eschatological cosmopolitanism.” It has a double mission. On the one hand, in relation to the Roman Empire, he behaved as an impartial “peregrinus;” though on the other hand, in relation to the various heretics and schismatics like Manichaeans, Arians, Pelagians and Donatists, he behaved as a very rigorous Catholic bishop, who advocated the necessity of “ecclesia toto orbe diffusa” and “universus orbis Christianus.” Namely, on the one hand Augustine as a “peregrinus” remained thoroughly within saeculum, i.e. in the intersection between civitas Dei and civitas terrena (the type I cosmopolitanism); but on the other hand, as a Catholic bishop he advocated the all-inclusive universal cosmopolitanism and suppressed the heretics and the schismatics rigorously.

It will become obvious why Augustine adopted such a dual position, if we could take his relevance to the other sects of Christianity or schismatics like Donatists into our consideration.

(1) Pay regard to the fact that the type I is a logical consequence of the type A; the $Ixy$ is implied by the $Axy$, only if “x” is not empty; and “x” is not empty; therefore the type I cosmopolitanism presupposes the type A cosmopolitanism.

(2) The type I is in contradiction to the type E; in addition to this, the type O is a logical consequence of the type E; the $Oxy$ is implied by the $Exy$, only if “x” is not empty; and “x” is not
empty; therefore, in order to be consistent with its own standpoint the type I must deny the existence of the type E.

(3) The type A is straightly in contradiction to the type O; thus, in order to be consistent with its own standpoint, the type I in cooperation with the type A has to thoroughly deny the existence of the type O cosmopolitanism.

It is obvious that the case of Tertullian should be considered in the relevance to the above-mentioned logical context. Tertullian the apologist advocated the radical divorce ment from Roman Empire. He said decisively:

"Nothing is more foreign (aliena) to us than the State (publica). One state we know, of which all are citizens—the universe (mundus)."

According to Tertullian, there was no intersection between “publica” (=Rome) and “mundus” (the universe=kingdom of God); similarly there was no intersection between “Athens” and “Jerusalem” as well as between “Academia” and “ecclesia.” These utterances clearly point to the type E cosmopolitanism, which Augustine as a "peregrinus" had to deny flatly.

Augustine, on the other hand, brought thoroughly pressure upon the Donatist movement, since it was at open defiance to Catholicism. From Catholic viewpoint (the type A), the Donatist movement (the type O) was nothing other than a thorn in the flesh of Christianity.
VIII LOGICAL ASPECTS OF DIOGENES’ COSMOPOLITANISM

Now it is time to bring our pending problem concerning the interrelationship between two cosmopolitanisms to an issue.

Let us begin with Alexander’s case and remember his utterance “I must alter the standard of coinage and stamp foreign states with the impress of Greek government.” The word “Greek government” in this context functions as a flag mark, as I have pointed out previously, of the Greek government *writ large*, under which “all human beings should be members of the same people and fellow citizens, and hence also there should be one way of life and one cosmos.” Namely, under this flag mark Alexander as a *mediator* for the whole world justified his own aggressive behavior and arrogantly insisted that every foreign state \((x)\) should be compelled to depend on the Greek government *writ large* \((y)\). Thus, he continued to conquer the foreign states “by force of arms” \((κοινοσ απόλοις βιαζόμενος)\) every state everywhere. Therefore we may regard the Alexander’s cosmopolitanism as a case of *Axy*, which we may call for the present merely an extreme case of the “universal cosmopolitanism.”

What of then the Diogenes’ case? It is significant to remember a fact that his immediate adversary was, as I elucidated in the opening part of this paper, not Alexander but Aristotle.

We must reconfirm here a fact that for Aristotle Diogenes was only a homeless \(\deltaικος\), a city-less fellow \(\alphaπολις\) who was a “natural outcast” having no part of city-state \(\ουθεν μερος πόλεος\), so that he was nothing other than a “beast” \(\thetaηριον\). Now, let us return to that scene, where Diogenes answered someone’s *ridiculous* question
"Where did you come from?" with the word "I am a citizen of the universe."

But, why should I adhere to the epithet "ridiculous"?—For it was a very mischievous question by a person, who was so narrow-minded that s/he never recognized Diogenes as a member of his/her polis. It is obvious that the questioner's true motive was to indicate his/her intention of excluding Diogenes (the non-citizen) from the polis; the gist of the motive, therefore, may be expressed as follows: "No non-citizen is a member of the polis" or "every non-citizen is a non-member of the polis."

It is needless to say that these statements are the cases of the type $E$ and the type $A$, each of which does not immediately presuppose the existence of members of the "polis" (Π) or of "non-citizen" (N) respectively. On the other hand, both statements are in contradiction to the statements "Some non-citizens are not members of the polis" and also "Some non-citizens are members of the polis;" Namely, each of the latter universal statement can be immediately negated by the former particular statements.

Therefore, in order to give a counterattack to that mischievous question and "deface" its validity (=the currency), Diogenes, in the first place, had to voluntarily acknowledge that he was a "non-citizen," since otherwise he could not show that the class "non-citizen" (N) was not void.

But, speaking more exactly, which part of the class "non-citizen" did he wish to belong to? For the class "non-citizen" (N) can be subdivided into "α" (\{N ∩ Π'\}) and "β" (\{N ∩ Π\}); and if the domain $α$ (\{N ∩ Π'\}) is not void (the sign "⋆" in the following diagram shows the case that there is something), i.e. if the statement that "Some non-citizens are not members of the polis" is true, then
the universal affirmative statement "every non-citizen is a non-member of the \textit{polis}" (${\{N \cap \Pi'} \}) is to be false; and if the domain $\beta({\{N \cap \Pi})$ is not void, then the universal negative statement "No non-citizen is a member of the \textit{polis}" (${\{N \cap \Pi'} \}) is to be false.

Now, in due consideration of the fact that Diogenes lived as an "\textit{ἀοικός}" as well as a "\textit{πτωχός}" in the domain of "τὰ ἱδία" like Socrates, we may conclude that he took his position in the domain $\beta$, which may be regarded as a fringe area of the \textit{polis}, where the different cultures and different peoples could hold the intersectional part in common.

Here, I would like to reconfirm a fact that Diogenes was such a "\textit{ἀγαθός δαιμόνιον}" who at the same time was a "parasite" and a "denunciator" of the urban society. He was a "\textit{κατάσκοπος}" (spy) upon the insatiable greed of the men of power, and a reconciler between "\textit{νόμος}" (convention) and "\textit{φύσις}" (nature), though in a radically different meaning from Alexander's case.

Therefore, in order to deface the "currency" of the established \textit{νόμοι} and to advocate his cosmopolitanism, Diogenes could not entrench himself like Donatists in the domain $\alpha$, but had to dwell in the inner part of the \textit{polis}.

The doxographical reports tell us that Diogenes was a city-dweller
and usually lived in Athens and Corinth. Dio Chrysostom says that Diogenes alternated between Athens and Sparta as did the Persian king between Sousa and Ecbatana. The fact has its own reason, since Diogenes was a “homeless” with a mission “παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα,” who was immediately in need of a place to sleep as well as the street or agora crowded with people, whom his mission is directly to be transmitted with “freedom of speech” (παρηγορία).

According to Diogenes Laertius, it was his habit to do everything in public (that is, in the domain β), the works of Demeter as well as of Aphrodite. Thus, pointing to the portico of Zeus and the Hall of Processions in Athens Diogenes said “the Athenians had provided me with place to live in.” He dined in the marketplace as well as in the temple; and behaving indecently in public, he uttered: “It were as easy to banish hunger by rubbing the belly.” Such a life-style was possible only in the metropolitan areas like Athens or Corinth.

As a matter of fact, the original birthplace of Cynicism was the Athenian society. Speaking more exactly, it was born in a public sphere (the domain β=κοινόν) of the Athenian society. In contrast to another public sphere of “δημόσιος” (“γ”=“Π∩Ν”=political mainstay of Athens), the domain β was a “κοινόν” in the level of everyday life, which was principally opened for every resident of the polis.

The domain in question was also a public space, whereat the communal activities like festivals and various cultural events took place. On the occasions for the opening of various public festivals such as the Panathenaia, the City Dionysia, and the Lenaia, the tragedies and the comedies were put on the stage and various peoples participated in these events in various manners. With the exception of the Thesmophoria conducted only by women, not only the citizens
but also women, *metoikoi* (immigrants) and even the slaves could participate in these public events.

It was also a traffic circle, where the exiles like Diogenes, the mercenaries, the raiders, the physicians, the builders, the sculptors, the courtesans, the cooks, the philosophers, the traders and the actors incessantly came and went, and the different vivid news and information were abundantly exchanged. In contrast with the official domain Υ, it was in a way a brewing laboratory, where the various "invisible" politics and association were informally developed and organized. Thus, in itself it was already an archetypal domain, from where the *κοσμόπολις* (cosmopolis) began to make its appearance.

IX  DIMENSION OF JUSTICE

Standing on this spot, Diogenes of Sinope uttered the phrase "I am a citizen of the universe" (*κοσμοπολίτης*) and tried to deface the currency of the "δημόσιος." Speaking more precisely, as I have argued so far, he challenged mainly to the authority of Aristotelian world-view, especially to his conception of the "political animal" and "the proportional logic" lurking behind it.

By the way, from the macroscopic range of view, the proportional logic in question had its own unexpected fortune. It gained acceptance in Christianity in its formative period via the creation theology brewed from an amalgam of Judaism and Greek philosophy, and became a critically significant cultural inheritance of Europeans. For, in due course, it gave birth to the fundamental matrix, which functioned as a prototypical reference pattern in the formation of the "sacred" European world-order. For Europeans this matrix was indeed very useful for the purpose of justifying their "rape" of the
"Barbarian" world. Because of this matrix, the native fields of the Slabs, American natives, Indians, Chinese, and even Japanese in the Far East had to suffer the mighty European's rape and were enslaved. The situation exactly corresponds to the case that Alexander the great subjugated and stamped foreign states with "the impress of Greek government."

Now, I want to proceed to disclosing the essential mechanism of this dialectic. The gist of this politico-social dialectic can be epitomized as follows:

(1) In order to actualize a closely tightened pyramid-like world order,

(2) This logic intends to establish a standard (μέτρον) which utilizes a mean proportional (μέσον) between the conflicting extremes, and

(3) Without giving any true solution to the conflicts by the medium of which the opposition between them arose, but

(4) Leaving the antithetical extremes as they are,

(5) Declares them as "by nature" differentiated and finally

(6) Projects this difference as a ratio (λόγος) into the real order (φύσις).

We should pay attention to a fact that the most important procedure (2) in the above formulation exactly corresponds to the status of "justice" (δίκαιον) in Aristotle's political philosophy. The subject of justice is, according to Aristotle, nothing other than the "mean" proportional. In the beginning of the Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says:

"In regard to justice (δικαιοσύνη) and injustice (ἀδικία), we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned
with, in what sense the justice is a mean (μεσότης), and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean (μέσον)."

Here Aristotle tells us in an unequivocal way that justice is a "mean" between extremes. But, why should justice be identified with a "mean" between extremes? And by the "extremes" what things are we to keep in our view? The problem is so complicated to be squarely explained in detail that it may be expedient to take shorter way. So, here, I would like to appeal to J. Rawls' skillful recapitulation of Aristotle's conception of justice. J. Rawls says:

"The concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role. Now this approach may not seem to tally with tradition. I believe, though, that it does. The more specific sense that Aristotle gives to justice, and from which the most familiar formulations derive, is that of refraining from pleonexia, that is, from gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what belongs to another, his property, his reward, his office, and the like, or by denying a person that which is due to him, the fulfillment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the showing of proper respect, and so on. It is evident that this definition is framed to apply to actions, and persons are thought to be just insofar as they have, as one of the permanent elements of their character, a steady and effective desire to act justly. Aristotle's definition clearly presupposes, however, an account of what properly belongs to a person and of what is due to him."
Now such entitlements are, I believe, very often derived from social institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise. There is no reason to think that Aristotle would disagree with this, and certainly he has a conception of social justice to account for these claims. The definition I adopt is designed to apply directly to the most important case, the justice of the basic structure. There is no conflict with the traditional notion.

Although J. Rawls does not make use of Aristotelian technical terms in a conspicuous way except for the term “pleonexia” which means the desire for an excessive amount of something, the above sentence is rather a clear-cut summarization of Aristotle’s conception of justice. As Rawls says, Aristotelian justice mainly concerns with “the principles in assigning rights and duties” as well as “the appropriate division of social advantages,” which justifies the refraining from pleonexia, presupposing that “an account of what properly belongs to a person and of what is due to him.”

The term “mean” itself does not appear in the above Rawls’ sentence, but it is implied by the words “the principles in assigning rights and duties” as well as “the appropriate division of social advantages;” “the principles” for “the appropriate division” is equivalent with the mean proportional in the framework of Aristotle’s theory of justice, because justice is, according to Aristotle, nothing other than the establishment of a mean between various extremes in the fields of actions, rights, duties, social advantages so on. And in the establishment of the mean, there is a prior approval concerning “what properly belongs to a person” or “what is due to him.”

Aristotle’s description of the different kinds of justice is very com-
plicated and hard to see through. But, it is beyond doubt that his main classification consists in the division into “general” and “particular” justice.” In each case the mean signifies a parameter, with respect of which “just” and “unjust” can be properly discriminated. Being such a parameter it is possible to fully function as a principle in assigning rights and duties or in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. Thus, the primary subject of justice is, in the case of Aristotle too, the basic structure of the society; its *raison d'être* consists in its way according to which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.

Therefore, the mean is nothing other than a crystallization point of such a “basic structure” of the *polis*. It was for Aristotle a pivotally important point of the “κοινωνία” (association) of the citizens, without which even the existence of the *polis* cannot be held. Thus, referring to justice in reciprocity, which prepares the material conditions for the existence of the *polis*, Aristotle says:

“In the interchange of services justice in the form of reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association (κοινωνία): reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the *polis* depends on proportionate reciprocity.”

It is a noteworthy fact that justice in reciprocity concerns not only the exchange of commodities, but also the legislation of the relation between the ruling and the ruled among *citizens*. The reciprocal equality among *citizens* preserves the unity of the *polis*. And people’s demands for proportional equality has an immediate link with
citizen's different demands for "justice in distribution" and for "the common good" in the domain of civil activities which can be identified with the domain of "δημόσιος." The basic structure of the polis grows on the material foundation prepared by the actualization of "justice in reciprocity" among people.

But, who is a citizen? What is the interrelationship between the citizen and the non-citizen? By the term "citizen" Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics keeps, without fail, in his mind thoroughly in accordance with custom in his contemporary society; in brief, the person who is qualified to participate in political activities in assemblies, jury courts, magistracies and who has the right to bear arms. Therefore, it is obvious that Aristotelian justice ranges over solely the body of citizens, i.e. the members of the domain of δημόσιος.

On the other hand, according to Aristotle's description of the best regime in the Politics, the citizenship is limited to the landowning class. Namely there, Aristotle divides the constitution of the polis into two constituents, i.e. into "the things that are parts of the polis" and "the things that are indispensables." The military and deliberative classes are parts of the polis; and tillers of the soil, craftsmen, and laboring class are "a necessary appurtenance" of the polis; and the appurtenance are permanently separated from the military and deliberative class; the citizenship is monopolized by the military and deliberative class, which is also a landowning class.

The laboring class in general is not bestowed with the citizenship. In addition to this, the tillers of the soil must be either "slaves" or "serfs of alien race." The artisans must not have share in the citizen body (τὸ πολιτικὸν=δημόσιος), nor any other class that is not "an artificer of virtue." There is no mention to women and metoikoi. But,
it is obvious that they have no share in the citizen body, since they are not landowners. But, why should the laboring class not be bestowed with the citizenship? Aristotle answers as follows:

“At the present we are studying the best constitution, and this is the constitution under which the polis would be most happy, and it has been stated before that happiness cannot be forthcoming without virtue; it is therefore clear from these considerations that in the most nobly constituted polis (ἐν τῇ κάλλιστᾳ πολιτευμένῃ πόλει), and the one that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just relatively to the principle (τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαιούς ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν) that is the basis of the constitution, the citizens must not live a mechanic and mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best polis be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active participation in politics).”

Concerning Aristotle’s reference to “the constitution under which the polis would be most happy,” we must remember that Aristotle defines the polis as an association (κοινωνία) aiming at a certain kind of good. Note that in the above definition, “the association” is the genus of the polis and “the good” is the specific differentia specifying the type of association. Therefore what that prescribes the existence of a polis is the good and not justice; the good makes an association a polis, whereas justice makes what that is already a polis a particular kind of polis. In Aristotelian political philosophy, the good has priority over justice.

However, it is not always clear that by the sentence “the one[polis]
that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution” what things does Aristotle bear in his mind. But it may refer to the two kinds of just men, who are respectively related to general justice and special justice, provided that the latter has to do with justice in distribution.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle calls general justice “perfect virtue” (ἁρετὴ τέλεια). It is “the chief of the virtues” and “even the evening star or the morning star is no more sublime than this.” This perfect justice is not a mere part of virtue but the whole. Accordingly, the just man with this perfect virtue includes in himself all the other virtues. This relationship between the “perfect virtue” and “the other virtues” is parallel with that between the above two kinds of just men, i.e. the absolutely just men and the relatively just men. If it is the case, the meaning of the phrase “just relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution” also becomes clear, since in that case “the principle that is the basis of the constitution” may be construed as an allusion to justice in distribution, which is actualized in relation to each person’s ἄξια (value; worth; merit). For the just distribution consists in the situation that each person takes a mean (μέσον) between two things in relation to the standard of each person’s ἄξια; that is, just distribution is “τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν” (in accordance with ἄξια).

But, how can we assess someone’s ἄξια itself? In response to this question Aristotle in the *Politics* argues as follows: each person needs a *polis* in order to achieve the self-sufficient happy life; and if he is concerned for his happy life, he will be also concerned for a common good of the *polis*. Thus, the teleological forward-looking concern for the common good regulates the assessment of each person’s ἄξια, in relation to which justice in distribution functions.
The role of general justice is in the framework of this very teleological forward-looking concern for the common good. General justice aims at the common good and happiness of other peoples. How is, then, general justice is concerned with the common good of the political community? The lawfulness is, without doubt, a part of general justice. But, it is only a negative aspect of general justice and does not particularly deserve to be called "perfect virtue." It is called "perfect virtue," because it is concerned with the common good of the political community. Everyone who is a citizen and who has a true conception of his own happiness, Aristotle argues, must be concerned with the common good of himself, his friend and his fellow-citizens; and so deliberating he should have to do with the common good of the polis.

Aristotle probably believes that all rational agents could agree about the plan of the best life, although the choice of the good must come from each rational agent's deliberation and not by dictation from without. All reflective men, according to Aristotle, must choose the same good life. The argument, however, easily presupposes the congruent of each person's conception of the common good and ignores a fact that there are many conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the common good.

Take a case of the national administration for an example. It could be attained only through the strong competition and strife, which are developed by the opposing political parties or factions. Needless to say, setting a dispute about "the common good" and steering national administration towards a concrete and common advantage for citizens through such an intensive strife and opposing politics are very difficult and critical tasks. The work may be regarded as a huge endeavor, which tries to establish a "proportional mean" among
extremely diverse opinions. However, if such a “mean” cannot be found and the appropriate legislation (νομοθετεῖν) coping with such a situation becomes impossible, the polity would be divested of its self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) and dissolved through the process of strife and civil war (στάσις).

What that Aristotle bore in his mind when he was writing the sentence “that the middle form of constitution (ἡ μέση πολιτεία) is the best is evident; for it alone is free from faction,” was indeed precisely this: the establishment of a “μεσότης” (mean) in the midst of such a political maelstrom.

IX EPILOGUE

Aristotle’s especial concern for the “μεσότης” (mean) and the “αὐτάρκεια” (self-sufficiency) is derived from his fundamental assumption that the stability in a society is good, achievable, and is the basic aim of all political and economic arrangements.” From such a viewpoint, a disturbance such as faction and civil war between the “rich” and the “poor” was to be regarded as the most suspenseful matters, which might radically undermine the traditional solidarity of the citizen body.

It is notable that the propertied citizens in that time extensively held such a concern for the traditional solidarity of the citizen body in common. When Aristotle returned to Athens and was giving the lecture of proto-Politics to his students in the Lyceum (from the 335/334 BC), everywhere in the Greek world, there were severe struggles for land between the rich and the poor citizens. The poor citizens’ main demand was “redistribution of the land,” against which the propertied citizens had to live in constant fear everyday. Such being
the case, when the Greek cities were united in the so-called League of
Corinth (338-337 BC) under the leadership of Philip II, who was the
father of Alexander and probably a friend of Aristotle, all the cities
enlisted under Pax Macedonica swore an oath for “the universal
peace” (κοινὴ ἐλπὶς) in compensation for the renunciation of their
freedom and autonomy, the aim of which was a preparation to use
force against cities violated the status quo and not to permit land
redistribution, debt cancellation, unlawful confiscations, or manumis-
sion of slaves for revolutionary purposes.

Just at this point of the time, we should say, the traditional city-
states in most of the Greek world suffered in a decisive way a loss of
political freedom and autonomy. They were not any more independ-
ent city-states, but only the dependencies obliged to act in concert
with each other under the hegemony of Macedonian power. Thus,
the citizen body lost its substance and became the shadow of the
former figure. Nevertheless, there was no program, which attempted
to appeal to the cooperation with outsiders of the citizen body. On
the contrary, the citizens of the “large private clubs with closed
membership” (=Greek governments) clung obstinately to their
vested rights and thoroughly ignored the welfare of non-citizens,
whom Aristotle regarded as “the things that are indispensables.”
That is to say, they were “necessary,” to be sure, yet only the “
appurtenance.”

Now, it became quite clear that, in the Aristotelian best regime, all
the individuals who are women, metoikoi, slaves, and almost all
productive laborers cannot hope to have share in the legislation
(νομο-θέτημα) of happy life. Aristotle regards the laboring class not
only as fellows who are “ignoble” and “inimical to virtue,” but also
as fellows who are never worthy of having a share of the common advantage, which should exclusively be distributed among the citizens, whereas "the most nobly constituted polis" necessarily aims at "the most supreme of all goods."

Therefore, justice in the Aristotelian best regime does not deserve at all the name of justice. From the standpoint of Diogenes' animalism, which implies and advocates the equality of all human beings, its substance is but injustice.

But, why is justice exchangeable into injustice? Let me epitomize the mechanism in the context of Aristotle's theory of justice by taking "justice in distribution" as an example:

1. Justice is a law (νόμος).
2. Justice in distribution consists in the establishment of a mean (μέσον) between extremes relative to the standard of each person's ability.
3. Therefore, each person's ability is a final standard for measuring each person's value.
4. Money is a middle term (μέσον) by which all things are measured.
5. Each person's value is measured by money (νόμισμα) as a substitute for a person's demand.
6. Therefore, in order to establish just distribution, we must first establish a mean which is represented as the value of money."
7. However, money itself is a mere "currency" (νόμισμα), which does not exist by nature (φύσις) but by convention (νόμος).
8. Convention (νόμος) can be altered and rendered useless at will;
9. Therefore, justice (νόμος) can be altered and rendered useless at will.
Thus, justice can be altered at will and Aristotelian justice is not the true money (νόμισμα = the currency), which passes current with all over the world (κόσμος). Therefore, Aristotelian justice is injustice. Hence it is but the counterfeit currency, which should be defaced by a chisel-stamp (παραχαράττειν) and put out of circulation.

We may take this for Diogenes' real intention, which he has kept in his mind when he uttered the phrase "I am a citizen of the universe" (κοσμοπολίτης). And if it was the case, he intended not only to radically deface the currency of Aristotelian politico-social dialectic so as to nullify the traditional backbone of the domain of δημόσιος (= the domain Υ), but also to suggest his conception of a new political order "κοσμόπολις" (cosmopolis), which should be based on the animalism, and which necessarily implies the advocacy of universal human rights.

Now, the logical gist of the above-mentioned is as follows: if the currency of traditional backbone of the domain of δημόσιος is

\[ \text{Cosmos} \]

\[ \Omega \]

\[ \text{Cosmopolis} \quad \text{Polis} \]

\[ \text{K} \quad \text{Π} \]

\[ \{\text{Π} \cap \text{K}'\}' \quad \text{Π} \cap \text{K}'=\varnothing \]
nullified, the Aristotelian *polis* could no more be kept going, so that the interrelationship between the class "non-citizen" and the class "*polis*" will be transformed into that of \( \{\Pi \cap N\}' \). Then, this formula can be read as follows: "Every member of the *polis* \( \Pi \) is a non-citizen \( N \)."

It is true that the statement in question may sound not only strangely but also paradoxically. But, if we are admitted to take \( N \) to be an intersection between \( N \) itself and the universe \( \Omega \) and if we may call this afresh the "cosmopolis" \( K \), then the above formula will be equivalent to the meaning of \( \{\Pi \cap K\}' \). Therefore, we may take this for the statement "every member of the *polis* \( \Pi \) belongs to the cosmopolis \( K \)" or "every member of the *polis* \( \Pi \) is a member of the cosmopolis \( K \)."

Is this cosmopolitanism consistent with Alexander's? No, it is not. As well known, every foreign state incorporated into the Alexander's cosmopolis *in arms* was obliged to serve as a "subject" in "the Greek government *writ large*." The famous practice of "προσκύνησις" (obeisance), which Alexander introduced and forced to all of his subjects, shows the circumstances symbolically. Alexander's was not only a mere universal cosmopolis, but also an imperial one. Therefore, we should define Alexander's as an "Imperialistic Cosmopolis."

In contrast with this, Diogenes' cosmopolitanism based on his animalism was, as I have suggested in the above context referring to Moles' theory previously, in that respect of the fact that it expressed a positive attitude to the natural world including the whole world of living things and recognized a cooperative order (δυναμικώνα) between them which transcends the conventional barriers between men and women and between the races, provably, not only anti-authoritarian,
democratic, and environmental, but also humanistic so as to recognize the common humanity.

However, unfortunately, we have only a scanty testimonia referring to Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism in the Life and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers written by Diogenes Laertius, the only source that provides a systematic account of Cynic teaching. We cannot detect in this book any concrete expressions conveying Diogenes’ original words, which delineate the image of his cosmopolis. However, Diogenes’ text, if it were survived, would not be an argument (λόγος) but a kind of story (μῦθος), which was humorously described in its conception as well as in its expression. For it appears to be a kind of “σπουδαῖο γέλοιον” (seriocomic), the popular style of which originated from the old Comedy and the satyr play. However on its concrete expression, unfortunately, we cannot rely on Diogenes’ own depiction. But, according to the phrasing of Crates the immediate disciple of Diogenes, it was a polis called “Beggar’s bag” (Πήλη).

There is a city Pera in the midst of wine-dark vapour,
Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owing nought,
Into which sails nor fool nor parasite
Nor glutton, slave of sensual appetite,
But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,
For which things’ sake men fight not each with other,
Nor stand to arms for money or for fame.

This “Beggar’s bag,” where “men fight not each with other (οὐ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους), nor stand to arms for money (οὐχ ὀπλα κέκτηνται περὶ κέρματος) or for fame (οὐ περὶ δόξης),” immediately reminds us Plato’s conception of the “polis of minimum
indispensables” (ἀναγκαστάτη πόλις), the so-called “polis of pigs” (ὑδάν πόλις), which Socrates affectionately called “the healthy” (ὑγίης) and “the true polis” (ἀληθινή πόλις).

It is a peaceful polis, where people know neither “poverty” nor “war.” Such being the case, because of its frugality and “αὐτάρκεια” (self-sufficiency), it should be evaluated as a reversed figure of Alexander’s cosmopolis in arms. Therefore, it is proper to be called “Alexander’s Cosmopolis μαίνομενος,” or “Madden Alexandro-cosmopolis.”

So far I have argued that Diogenes’ cosmopolis could be actualized, only when the stronghold protected by the Aristotelian politico-social dialectic will be totally destroyed. Thus, substituting the “animal” for that third term, i.e. for the tertium comparisonis in the Aristotelian analogy, and uttering boldly a word “κοσμοπολίτης,” Diogenes of Sinope, the notorious dog philosopher, advocated “μόνην τε ὀρθήν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ” (the only true government is that which is in the cosmos.) And so doing, he defaced decisively the currency of the traditional world-order and made the first step toward the creation of “true,” “peaceful,” and “healthy” cosmopolis, wherein all human beings could be fellow citizens and could attain their freedom and happiness.

NOTES

(1) A part of an earlier and shorter version of this paper titled by 'The Legend of Σωκράτης Μαϊνόμενος' was read in the Fourteenth International Conference on Greek Philosophy under the title “Polis and Cosmopolis: Problems of a Global Era, which was held by International Association for Greek Philosophy in cooperation with the Ministry of Aegean, the Ministry of Culture,
the Ministry of Education, the Prefecture of Samos & Ikaria, the Municipality of Pythagorion and the University of Athens under the Aegis of the President of the Hellenic Republic, and which took place in Samos Island, Greece, in 2th-8th, August, 2002.


Our most valuable source is *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* written by Diogenes Laertius in the late second or early third century A.D., which contains the long Life of Diogenes and short biographies of nine other Cynics who lived in the late fourth and early third centuries B.C. It is valuable because the author, who was uncritical but diligent and honest, tried to put together the best portrait of Cynicism, which he could compile the materials from earlier biographers and doxographers, relying heavily upon Hellenistic sources. The Life of Diogenes in *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* consists of the following sections:

Book 6.20-23: a connected biographical account.
Book 6.24-30: 32-69, 75-76: a chatoic mass of anecdotes (*chreiai*).

6.30-32: one version of the sale of Diogenes by the satilist Menippus (Third cent. BC).
6.74-75: another version of the sale of Diogenes by an unknown Eubulus
6.70-73: a doxographical summary.
Book 6.80-81: appendices on Diogenes’ writings and on other men with the same name.


The recent contributions to the Cynic studies include the following:

(3) It is notable that before Diogenes, there were sentiments for cosmopolitanism among Greek thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Euripides, Antiphon, Hippias, Alcidamas, and others. But Diogenes was the first protagonist among all, because of the fact that he used or made for the first time a word "κοσμοπολίτης."
(4) Plutarch, *De Fortuna Alexandri*, 329c.

(5) See for example D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism*, Bristol Classical Press, 1998, p. 35. Considering into the apparent differences between them, it may be considered as a startling fact that they have been often regarded as a couple like twins who held their standpoints in so common that they could be indiscriminately identified with each other. However, they are to be carefully distinguished.

(1) Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism goes historically ahead of Alexander’s one and has its own priority over the latter.

(2) Whereas the former is essentially an heir to Socratic-Antisthenic tradition, which was democratic and egalitarian tradition which may be characterized as a bottom-up type of cosmopolitanism, the latter is a top-down type of cosmopolitanism which may be characterized as an authoritarian and despotic one.


(8) D. L. 6.63.

(9) D. L. 6.72.

(10) D. R. Dudley in his *A History of Cynicism* says: “It is essential not to read too much into this profession. For us ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a conception carries an emotional colour which is the legacy of Alexander, transmitted through the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. But as Tarn says, the phrase as used by Diogenes was one of negation, meaning, ‘I am not a citizen of any of your Greek cities’ (p. 35). See also G. Giannantoni, ed., *Socraticorum Relinquiae*, vol. 3, Rome 1985, pp. 537–547; Cf. also M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 141–45.

(11) See, for an example, Doyne Dawson’s evaluation of Diogenic *Republic*. He says: “I suggest that Diogenic *Republic* was one of
two things. It is possible that Diogenes, or some other early Cynic, really wrote a *Republic*, but if so this was a playful utopia like those of the Old Comedy; and a parody of the *Republic* of Plato, in the Cynic burlesque tradition. Aristotle did not include it among the serious utopias because it was not one. Nevertheless it was *spoudaiogeloios*: it was intended as a serious critique of the Platonic utopia, particularly its authoritarianism and military organization. ... The other solution—perhaps a simpler one, perhaps easier to square with our evidence for the content and history of the text—is that the Diogenic *Republic* was a third-century Stoic forgery based on the *Republic* of Zeno and intended to support the theory of a close *koinonia* between the Cynic and Stoic traditions. In either case, there was no real Cynic utopia. It was Zeno who first tried to create a serious utopian vision inspired by the Cynic life." Doyne Dawson, *Cities of The Gods, Communist Utopias in Greek Thought*, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 150–151.


(14) Concerning the relationship between "τὰ Ἐιδια" and "δημοσιος" we should refer to the funeral oration delivered by Pericles in 431/30 (Thuc. 2.34ff.) as the oldest case referring to them. In 2.37.2 Pericles appeals:

"While in our private matters (τὰ Ἐιδια) we conduct ourselves without offense, in our public matters (τὰ δημοσια) our reverent respect restrains us from lawlessness, for we obey both persons in authority and the laws, especially those established for the aid of people who have been wronged, and those which, although unwritten, bring a shame on men who break them that everyone recognizes."
On the other hand, referring to the same distinction between "private" and "public" Pericles in 2.40. says as follows:

"You will find united in the same people an interest both in personal matters and public affairs (οικεῖον ἀμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλειαν), and even those mostly occupied with their own endeavors know a good deal about political matters (τὰ πολιτικὰ). For we alone regard the man who takes no part in such things not as one who minds his own business (ἀπράγμονα), but as one who has no business here at all (ἄχρειον)."

It is obvious that "τὰ ἑαυτὰ" corresponds to "οικεῖον" and "τὰ δημόσια" corresponds to "πολιτικῶν or τὰ πολιτικὰ." It is noteworthy that Pericles in this context appeals to the Athenian citizens and is insisting "the man who takes no part in "τὰ πολιτικὰ" is "ἄχρειον" (a good for nothing person). Cf. also the above mentioned my book, pp. 246-247.

(15) According to Onesicritus (FGH 134.17a36-7), Alexander was a "philosopher in arms" (ἐν ὄπλοις φιλοσοφοῦντα).

(16) D. L. 6.24; 25; 26; 40; 41; 53; 54; 58; 67.

(17) Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, 3. 10. 1411a24-25, on the other hand, refers to Diogenes of Sinope as "the dog" and says: "the dog used to call taverns 'the mess tables of Attica';" only if Aristotle does not refer to Antisthenes as "ἀπλοκύων" by the word "the dog" in question. See M.-O.-Goulet-Cazé, 'Who was the First Dog?' in R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé(ed.) The Cynics, the Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, University of California Press, 1996., pp. 414-415.

(18) On the other hand, it might be the case that Aristotle in Politics 1253a26-29 had in his mind the figure of Diogenes the dog. See Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, 'Religion and the Early Cynics' in R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé(ed.) The Cynics, the Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, University of California Press, 1996, p. 61, note 87.

(20) Ibid.

(21) *Politics* 1253a3.

(22) *Politics* 1253a27–28.

(23) *Politics* 1253a4.

(24) *Politics* 1253a27.

(25) *Politics* 1253a28.

(26) *Politics* 1253a5.

(27) Why is it acceptable that “a man who is without a state” finds his position turned into that of “the beast” in the midst of giving a definition of “man” as a “political animal”? It is because Aristotle identifies such a man as a beast. According to Aristotle, such a man cannot find his position in the category of “man.” It is obvious from this that in his statement about “θηρίου ὁ θεός” Aristotle does not necessarily use the word “θηρίου (beast)” in a strictly zoological sense. However it is doubtful that one could specify “the beast” from a zoological point of view. We must insist that the beast is no less definable than that “weeds” could not be defined in the field of morphological botany. The “weeds” are our subjective projection into the outer world, aiming at distinguishing useless grasses from useful ones. They are not “by nature weeds.” The word “weed” is a normative term attached to some kinds of grasses from an artificial point of view relative to human cultures. Thus it is evident that Aristotle here uses the word “beast” as a certain kind of normative term whose function is founded on a particular understanding of “man.” See my book *Greek Philosophy and the Modern World*, Studies in Greek Philosophy Series, The International Center for Greek Philosophy


(29) D. L. 6.38.

(30) D. L. 6.75.

(31) D. L. 6.60. See also 6.55.

(32) Aristotle's conception of man in the Politics can be formalized as the following analogy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A(god)</th>
<th>B(man)</th>
<th>C(animal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FACTORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$: no need of association</td>
<td>$a'$: in need of association</td>
<td>$a'$: in need of association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$: having sense of good and evil</td>
<td>$b$: having sense of good and evil</td>
<td>$b'$: not having sense of good and evil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let it be the case that $A = ab$, $B = a'b$, $C = a'b'$, then the essence of man can be formulated as follows: $ab : a'b = a'b : a'b'$. See my book in the above-mentioned, pp. 135-136.

(33) D. L. 6.22.

(34) See also Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*, 13.26: "Diogenes of Sinope lived alone and rejected by the world. He was avoided because of his carping manner and his dissatisfaction with everything that was said or done. So Diogenes was miserable and ate barley-bread and green shoots—that was what he had. A mouse used to come and take crumbs of his bread. Diogenes watched closely what was happening, smiled and became more cheerful than he had been, remarking 'This mouse does not need any of the luxuries of the Athenians, but you, Diogenes, are annoyed at not dining with Athenians.' And he provided himself with timely comfort." See also Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, 'Religion and the Early Cynics' in R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (ed.) *The Cynics, the Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, University of California Press, 1996, p. 60.

(36) *Politics* 1253a29.


(38) D. L. 6.20.

(39) D. L. 6.37. See also D. L. 6.72.

(40) Ps.-Lucian, *Cynicus* 12.


(42) D. L. 6.55.

(43) D. L. 6.74.

(44) D. L. 6.29.


(47) D. L. 6.31; 32.


(49) D. L. 6.20-21.

(50) D. L. 6.54. See also Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*, 14.33: "Plato used to say of Diogenes, according to reports, that he was a mad Socrates."

(51) Plato dies in the 427 BC. On the other hand, according to the evidence adduced by Seltman, the date of Diogenes' arrival at Athens cannot have been much earlier than 340 BC. If this date is


(53) *Clouds*, 1400.

(54) *Clouds*, 1421ff. Remember here Aristotle’s mentioning to the money and its alterability at will in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book V, 1133a: “this is why money is called ‘nomisma’ (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom (οὒ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμου ἐστὶ), and can be altered and rendered at will.” Cf. also Niehues-Pröbsting’s note 6 in the chapter II ‘Sokrates mainomenos oder der Verruckte Sokrates’ in *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus*, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 1979, p. 46.


(60) *Apology*, 21b-22e.

(61) *Apology*, 21a.

(62) *Apology*, 22a.

(63) What is then the “reputation” in this case? It may be defined as “good name accepted by people in general”; on the other hand, “general acceptance” is equivalent to the “currency”; therefore, the “reputation” means “current good name,” i.e. “good name in circulation.”

(64) Plato, *Apology*, 29e-30a.

(65) See Plato, *Phaedrus*, 230c-d.


(70) D. L. 6.32.

(71) Plato, *Crito*, 52b.


(73) *Crito*, 53c.

(74) *Crito*, 48b.

(75) *Crito*, 54b.

(76) *Crito*, 50e.


(78) *Apology*, 37d.


(80) D. L. 2.105.

(81) *Crito*, 52c-d.

(82) For the original indictment, see DL. 2.40;

(83) D. L. 6.38.

(84) *Apology*, 31a.

(85) Thucydides, 2.37.3.

(86) See Mariko Sakurai, ‘Lysias to Socrates’ in *Socrates no Rinjin-tachi (Socrates’ Neighbors)*, Publisher Yamakawa, Tokyo, 1997, pp. 241–255.

(87) Epictetus, Book I, IX, 1-6: “If what is said by the philosophers regarding the kinship of God and men be true, what other course remains for men but that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never to say “I am an Athenian,” or “I am a Corinthian,” but “I am a citizen of the universe”? For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning merely that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth? Or is it clear you take the place which has a higher degree of authority and
comprehends not merely that corner of yours, but also your family and, in a word, the source from which your race has come, your ancestors down to yourself, and from some such entity call yourself "Athenian," or "Corinthian"? Well, then anyone who has attentively studied the administration of the universe and has learned that "the greatest and most authoritative and most comprehensive of all governments is this one, which is composed of men and God, and that from Him have descended the seeds of being, not merely to my father or to my grandfather, but to all things that are begotten and that grow upon earth, and chiefly to rational beings, seeing that by nature it is theirs alone to have communion in the society of God, being intertwined with him through the reason," why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the universe?"


(90) John L. Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’ in the above cited, pp. 109-110:

"First, Diogenes did not say, in the context of D. L. 6.63, 'I am without a polis' (apolis eimi), nor did he write, in the context of D. L. 6.72, 'There is no good government' (oudemia politeia orthē estin). His formulations were formally positive, a factor to which we must accord its full importance, since he could have answered, 'I am without a polis,' as he did on other occasions. If in 1996 you are asked, 'Are you French or German?' and you reply, 'I am European,' the reply entails both the rejection of a restrictive nationalism and the assertion of a larger loyalty.

Second, Diogenes' sentiments must be interpreted not in a vacuum but rather against a general tradition in which the polis or the "fatherland" (patris) or some similar concept is rejected, or
revalued, in favor of an internationalist or cosmopolitan ideal. Given that the various corresponding sentiments of Heraclitus, Euripides, Antiphan, Hippias, Alcidamas, and others have a positive value, it cannot be justifiable to restrict the parallel formulations of Diogenes to a negative sense.

Third, not only do Diogenes' sentiments form part of a tradition: we must also take account of the philosophical rivalry between Diogenes and Aristippus, which I take to be historical, at least to the extent that there is a certain relationship between their philosophical systems and that Diogenes certainly criticized Aristippus. Scholars have noted a relationship between Diogenes' sentiments and those of Aristippus as reported by Xenophon. Their philosophical rivalry surely indicates some direct relationship, as Plutarch sensed. Aristippus maintains his freedom by not shutting himself up in a politeia ("state," "government," "polity"), which seems to him "against nature." and by maintaining his status of "stranger" (xenos) everywhere—that is, everywhere on earth, among all kind. Like Aristippus. Diogenes maintains his freedom by rejecting the polis, which seems to him "against nature," but whereas Aristippus is a "stranger" (xenos), Diogenes is a "citizen" (polites), and whereas Aristippus operates "among human beings." Diogenes operates "in the cosmos." The attitude of Diogenes is much more positive than that of Aristippus: Diogenes substitutes the positive and the engaged (polites, politeia) for the negative and disengaged, and he extends his sphere of operations beyond the world of human beings. Clearly, Diogenes defeats Aristippus in the debate. In short, the relationship between the sentiments of Diogenes and those of Aristippus is itself sufficient to prove that Diogenes' sentiments have a positive content.

Fourth, let us consider the precise form of these sentiments. They are paradoxes, which provoke and challenge us to find a meaning in apparent absurdities. How can a polites, a member of so small a group as a polis, be a polites ("citizen") of the kosmos ("cosmos"), the largest organism imaginable? How can the only
true politeia ("government"), a single small entity, be coextensive the cosmos? This is the ultimate "defacing" of "the political currency." As in other celebrated Cynic formulations, the challenge to find a meaning is formulated in terms of polar oppositions. The answers suggested by the majority of modern scholars—"I am a citizen of no polis" and "There is no good government"—are on the one hand intolerably banal and on the other hand no account of these polar oppositions.

Fifth, the sentiments are paradoxical in another sense. For they seem to contradict Cynic doctrines themselves. How can the Cynic, severe critic of the polis, be a politês ("citizen")? How can this savage outsider advocate a political kosmos ("cosmos")? How can the apolitical man par excellence be engagé? How can the despiser of cosmology embrace the cosmos? These paradoxes also demand substantive answers. These are my five "proofs." I submit that individually and cumulatively they prove that Diogenes' sentiments must have positive content."

(95) D. L. 6.32.
(96) D. L. 6.32.
(97) D. L. 6.32; 38; 43; 44; 45; 60; 63; (66;) 68. See also Plutarch, Lives, VII, Alexander, xiv.
(99) Mr. 10.31; Cf. also Lk. 18.30, Mt. 19.26.
(100) Like the Cynic, indeed, Jesus Christ expressed so radical attitude toward family and property that he himself renounced not only his family, but also advised his disciples to leave everything at their call their properties and families.
(101) Mark 10.17-31 including the above quoted sentence “πολλοὶ δὲ ἐζούνται πρώτοι ἔσχατοι καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι πρώτοι” runs as follows:

“(17) As he was setting out on a journey, a man ran up and knelt before him, and asked him, 'Good Teacher, what must I do
to inherit eternal life?' (18) Jesus said to him, 'Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone. (19) You know the commandments: 'You shall not murder; You shall not commit adultery; You shall not steal; You shall not bear false witness; You shall not defraud; Honor your father and mother.' (20) He said to him, 'Teacher, I have kept all these since my youth.' (21) Jesus, looking at him, loved him and said, 'You lack one thing; go, sell what you own, and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me.' (22) When he heard this, he was shocked and went away grieving, for he had many possessions. (23) Then Jesus looked around and said to his disciples, 'How hard it will be for those who have wealth to enter the kingdom of God!' (24) And the disciples were perplexed at these words. But Jesus said to them again, 'Children, how hard it is to enter the kingdom of God! (25) It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God.' (26) They were greatly astounded and said to one another, 'Then who can be saved?' (27) Jesus looked at them and said, 'For mortals it is impossible, but not for God; for God all things are possible.' (28) Peter began to say to him, 'Look, we have left everything and followed you.' (29) Jesus said, 'Truly I tell you, there is no one who has left house or brothers or sisters or mother or father or children or fields, for my sake and for the sake of the good news, (30) who will not receive a hundredfold now in this age—houses, brothers and sisters, mothers and children, and fields, with persecutions—and in the age to come eternal life. (31) But many who are first will be last, and the last will be first.' See also Lk 18.18-30; Mt. 19.16-26.


(103) Mt. 6.25-34; Lk. 12.22-34.

(104) D. L. 6.25; 33; 36; 40; 41; 44; 45; 46; 47; 48; 50; 52; 55; 58; 60; 61; 71; 73; 75; 76; 77.

(105) See Doyne Dawson, Cities of the Gods, Communist Utopias in
(111) It is needless to say that Diogenes was a homeless. On the other hand, Jesus in Lk. 9.58 (Mt. 8.20) says: “Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.” In addition to this fact, it is notable also that both of them rejected “home” and “family”. See D. L. 6.72 in the case of Diogenes; See Mt. 10.34–37; 13.46–50; 20.29 in the case of Jesus.
(116) Ibid.
(117) D. L. 7.4.
(119) D. L. 6.32. See also Plutarch, Lives, VII, Alexander, xiv.
(120) On the Fortune of Alexander, in Plutarch’s Moralia IV, 33b-c.
(121) See Isocrates, Olympic orations, 47ff. Cf. also Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, Harvard University Press, 1961, Chapter V.
(122) “Plato wrote a book on the One Ideal Constitution, but because of its forbidding character he could not persuade anyone to adopt it; but Alexander established more than seventy cities
among savage tribes, and sowed all Asia with Grecian magistracies, and thus overcame its uncivilized and brutish manner of living. Although few of us read Plato's Laws, yet hundreds of thousands have made use of Alexander's laws, and continue to use them." (328d-e)

"If, then, philosophers take the greatest pride in civilizing and rendering adaptable the intractable and untutored elements in human character, and if Alexander has been shown to have changed the savage natures of countless tribes, it is with good reason that he should be regarded as a very great philosopher." (329a)

"Moreover, the much-admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field. This Zeno wrote, giving shape to a dream or, as it were, shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth; but it was Alexander who gave effect to the idea. For Alexander did not follow Aristotle's advice to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader, and other peoples as if he were their master." (329a-b)

(123) 328e-f.
(125) Ibid.
(128) Especially in the murders of Cleitus and of Callisthenes.


(133) Cf. the concluding part of the above mentioned my paper ‘Cosmopolitan’s Logic and Morals [I];’ especially p. 177.


(136) Cf. the above mentioned my paper ‘Cosmopolitan’s Logic and Morals [I];’ especially p. 176.


(138) *Ibid*.


(141) Cf. the above mentioned my paper ‘Cosmopolitan’s Logic and Morals [I];’ especially pp. 149-154.


(146) D. L. 6.45: “When some boys clustered round him and said, ‘Take care he doesn’t bite us,’ he answered, ‘Never fear, boys, a dog does not eat beetroot (τευτλία).’ Alexander was for him only such a “beetroot (τευτλία).”

(147) *Politics* 1253a6.

(148) *Politics* 1253a29.

(149) *Politics* 1253a29.

(150) D. L. 6.63.


According to Manville, the citizen of the polis (Athens) can be defined and explained as follows: “The citizens of the polis were native Athenian males who had reached the age of eighteen, and who had been duly registered in the same local Attic village unit, or deme, to which their fathers belonged. That registration embodied a formal and multisteped process. Candidates were scrutinized by fellow demes-men to ensure that they were eighteen, freeborn, and legitimate with regard to the lawful marriage of two Athenian parents. If the candidate was challenged, appeal to a jury court (dikasterion) was possible, and in all questionable cases a further scrutiny (dokimasia) by the democratic council (boule) was required. Successful candidates’ names were inscribed in a list kept by the deme, the lexiarchikon grammateion. Once entered into legal adulthood, citizens could expect to (and might be expected to) exercise a variety of specific prerogatives: to participate in Athenian cults, festivals, and
worship; to attend, speak, and vote in the popular assembly (ekklesia); to serve (after the age of thirty) as a juror in the law courts (dikasteria); to vote and (depending on age and eligibility) stand for elected and allotted offices (archai); to seek redress and receive protection under the laws; to have the capacity to own land in Attika; to receive public disbursements, whether for services provided, as special distributions, or as maintenance for hardships. The loyal Athenian might also be rewarded with public burial at state expense if he sacrificed his life on behalf of the polis. The chief obligation of citizens was to obey the laws of the polis. Indeed, appropriately the penalty for not doing so was often the loss of one's civic rights and privileges within the law (atimia). Military service and taxation were other obvious obligations, though these, just as certain privileges, fell to varying degrees upon citizens, in accordance with an individual's census rank. All citizens except those of the lowest order (iethes) were, liable for service in the hoplite army or cavalry. By the latter part of the fourth century, Athenian males between eighteen and twenty years of age were also obliged to undergo two years of preparatory military training (ephebeia). Upon completion, they were required to supply the necessary (and costly) equipment demanded by their regular military duty. Thetes served in the Athenian navy, typically on a voluntary but occasionally mandatory basis. Taxes in the Athenian polis were mostly indirect, and those such as harbor dues and import duties affected all citizens. Direct taxes (eisphorai) were levied from time to time, but were restricted to citizens of a certain minimum wealth (probably a net worth of 2,500 drachmas). The wealthiest men were also responsible for various liturgies (literally, "work on behalf of the community"), such as the command and maintenance of warships or the financing of festivals for the polis. Finally, any man who served in public office was required, at the end of his duties, to have his performance scrutinized and his financial dealings audited. Thus, all those who exercised any civic authority were hypeuthynoi, that is, subject to the legal examinations called
euthynai, and fully accountable for the course of their public service. Despite some differential privileges and obligations based on rank, Athenian citizenship embodied an overall legal status, defined by identifiable boundaries."

"The boundaries become most clear when we compare citizenship to the status of various groups of non-Athenians in Attic society. Classical law distinguished Athenians from foreigners (xenoi), resident aliens (metoikoi), and slaves (doulos). Unlike the citizen, the xenos could not hold public office, own Attic land, or marry an Athenian woman; if he wished to trade in the public marketplace, he had to pay a special tax (xenika). His rights and access to justice in the Athenian courts were severely limited. The foreigner who wished to settle permanently in Attika as a metoikos had to be sponsored by an Athenian citizen (prostates) and be willing to pay a yearly tax on his inferior status, the metoikion. Once registered, the metoikos gained a certain legal advantage over other foreigners, though he still shared many of their disabilities, such as a prohibition against marriage with an Athenian woman. Moreover, metoikoi were also liable for two serious responsibilities of citizens, military service and (if wealthy enough) the obligations of liturgies and taxes such as eisphorai. In the courts, the metoikos stood at marked disadvantage to the Athenian. In addition to certain procedural disadvantages (e.g., inability to act as a prosecutor in public indictments or graphai), metoikoi might suffer what no citizen feared: torture to extract judicial testimony. Slaves also could be tortured for testimony, which is not surprising given their even more lowly status under Athenian law. Like other items of property, and unlike all free men and women in society (citizens or others), douloi could be bought, sold, hired out, bequeathed, or given away by their owners. With few exceptions, slaves were the responsibility of their masters in any legal action and had no official identity of their own. The superior status of the full citizen of the polis is manifest in homicide law, The known procedures and penalties indicate that the murder of any non-Athenian counted for less
than the murder of an Athenian. The man who slew a citizen (or his Athenian daughter or wife) was tried before the court of the Areopagos, and could receive the death sentence; the man who slew a metoikos, xenos, or doulos went before a lesser court, the Palladion, and was liable only to exile. Athenian law held Athenian life dearer and maintained a firm separation between members and non-members of the polis. Two other Athenian groups, women and children, deserve brief mention because of their ambiguous position in the society. Athenian women were members of the Athenian community, but belonged to the polis in a legal sense only indirectly—through their relationship with a father, husband, or other male relative who acted as their master and guardian (kyrios) in all important affairs. Athenian women, and a fortiori Athenian girls, could not own or inherit property, enter into contracts, or take independent action to marry or divorce; through their kyrios, however, they enjoyed the full protection of any citizen under the law. Male children held a status similar to that of Athenian women. Until they came of age and entered adulthood, Athenian boys were wholly dependent on a kyrios (normally the father) for their legal identity in the polis."

(152) The latter (Axy") is an obverted statement of the former (Exy'). Exy' does not refer to the existence of either "x" or "y." Similarly Axy" (= Axy) does not refer to the existence of "x." Therefore, in order to infer Oxyl from Exy' one must presuppose the existence of "x." Similarly in order to infer Ixy' from Axy one must presuppose the existence of "x."

(153) This case corresponds exactly to the fact that Diogenes defined himself as a homeless who suffered all the curses of tragedy (D. L. 6.38). In relevance with Diogenes' answer "I am a citizen of the universe," this implies that he gave a pledge to saying as follows: "It is true that I do not have the citizenship issued by a particular polis, but because of it I am a citizen of the universe."

(154) The word "Δοκος" (the homeless) means substantially "the non-citizen." On the other hand, "πτωχος" means "the beggar" (= parasite); cf. D. L. 6.38.
(155) D. L. 6.49.
(156) D. L. 6.41; 44; 45; 72.
(157) D. L. 6.43.
(158) D. L. 6.38.
(159) It was a time when "the power of city governments ceased to be the sovereign power in most of the Greek world" and when "a large number of people were not living as settled inhabitants of city-state communities." See Paul McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC*, Routledge, 1989, pp. 2-3.
(161) D. L. 6.69.
(162) D. L. 6.69.
(163) D. L. 6.23.
(164) D. L. 6.61.
(165) D. L. 6.64.
(166) D. L. 6.46; 69.
(168) This denotes the public domain referring to the organization of citizens, i.e. to the polis as a political community. Cf. note 14. Cf. also Mariko Sakurai, 'Lysias to Socrates' in *Socrates no Rinjin-tachi (Socrates' Neighbors)*, Publisher Yamakawa, Tokyo, 1997, p. 244.
(172) By using the term "Aristotelian world-view" I do not refer only to Aristotle' world-view, but I bear in my mind Plato's political thought lurking behind Aristotle's political thinking.
(173) As we have observed in the beginning of this paper, making free use this logic, Aristotle spoke in defense of the slavery. See


(178) Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* begins with the following impressive words: "In regard to justice and injustice, we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense the justice is a mean, and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean." (1129a) An argument immediately follows to make definite the meanings of "the just" (1128a31-1129b1) and further "general justice" and "special justice" are distinguished from each other. Then, the latter is subdivided into "justice in distribution" and "justice in correction." Aristotle continues to discuss "reciprocal justice" immediately after his discussion of distributive justice and corrective justice. And he declares that this reciprocity does not coincide either with "distributive" or "corrective" justice." Then, a fairly long explanation of reciprocity follows, and, immediately after this, Aristotle introduces the concept of "political justice" which is divided again into "natural" and "conventional" justice. See my paper: 'Aristotle's Theory of Justice and the Modern World,' *Op. cit.*, p. 139.


(182) Cf. the context 1134a25-29.
(198) In this context Aristotle calls general justice “perfect justice” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1129a27), because it includes all the other virtues. This virtue of justice is “the chief of the virtues” and “even the evening star or the morning star is not more sublime than this (1129b26-29).” The perfect justice is not a mere part of virtue but the whole (1130a15-17). Therefore, the just man includes in himself all the other virtues (1129b26).
(199) B. Yack introduced in this context two categories, which are called “passive justice” and “active justice,” presupposing that Aristotle’s general justice corresponds to the latter. Aristotle’s general justice, according to him, is construed as the set of actions
that virtuous individuals would do in particular situation to pro-
mote the common advantage. See B. Yack, *The Problems of Politi-
cal Animal*. Community, Justice and Conflict in Aristotelian
Political Thought, University of California Press, 1993, pp. 161–163.


(201) See T. Irwin, *Aristotle’s First Principles*, Clarendon Press,

(202) See Martha Craven Nussbaum, ‘Shame, separateness, and
Political Unity,’ in A. O. Rorty(ed.), *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*,

(203) J. Rawls, ‘Social Unity and Primary Goods,’ in A. Sen and B.
Williams(ed.), *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge University


(206) A. E. Samuel, *From Athens to Alexandria*: Hellenism and


O’Brien, *Alexander the Great*: The Invisible Enemy, A Biography,
Routledge, 1994, pp. 25–26; N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the
Great*, King, Commander and Statesman, Bristle Classical Press,


(211) See Paul McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the


(213) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252a5–6. In the Book VII of the *Politics*
Aristotle says: “The *polis* is one form of association of similar
people (κοινωνία τις τῶν ὁμοίων)” and its object is the best life
that is possible, i.e. “the happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as the greatest
good.” (1328a85ff)

(214) The reason is as follows: whereas justice presupposes the in-
equality (ἀνισον) between "the things that are parts of the polis" and "the things that are indispensables," the inequality (ἀνισον) must be, after all, unjust (ἄδικον). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 3, 3-4 Aristotle argues about justice in distribution as follows:

1. τὸ δίκαιον is an ἀνισον, hence τὸ δίκαιον is an ἱσον.
2. Τὸ ἱσον is a μέσον, hence τὸ δίκαιον is a μέσον.
3. Αμέσον is between certain extremes which are πλέον and ἐλαττον.
4. Τὸ ἱσον concerns at least two different things.
5. Τὸ δίκαιον is relative to at least two different persons.
6. Therefore τὸ δίκαιον implies at least four terms; a pair of persons and a pair of things.

(215) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1133b23.
(216) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1133b16-17.
(217) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1133b7-4.
(218) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1133a30.
(219) Ibid.

(221) Plutarch, On the Fortune of Alexander, 328fb: "τῶν ἀλόντων."
(222) See Arrian, History of Alexander and Indica, 4.0.5-12.5; Plutarch, Lives VII, 54.3-55.1. Cf. also John Maxwell O'Brien, Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy, A Biography, Routledge, 1994, pp. 142-3; 144; 147.

(223) Cf. Doyne Dawson, Cities of the Gods, Communist Utopias in Greek Thought, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 118-119; Cf. also R. Bracht Branham, 'Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism,' in R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé(ed.) The Cynics, the Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, University of California Press, 1996, p. 93: "Mary Douglas has argued, the form of a joke "rarely lies in the utterance alone" and can only be understood with reference "to the total social situation." The Cynics' innovation consists of
exploiting this fact polemically as a way of defining themselves in opposition—not to this or that group, but to the authority of society to dictate thought and behavior. ... The Cynic motto—“Deface the Current Coin” (*paracharattein to nomisma*)—makes joking, parody, and satire not merely a useful rhetorical tool, but an indispensable one, constitutive of Cynic ideology as such. Humor is the chisel stamp of Cynic discourse.”

(224) D. L. 6.85.

(225) Plato, *Republic*, II, 369D.


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The Origin of Cosmopolitanism

YAMAKAWA, Hideya

Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412/403-324/321BC), the famous dog philosopher, was not only the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity, but also the first protagonist of cosmopolitanism. Declaring himself "without a city," "without a home," and "citizen of the universe," Diogenes preached his "cosmopolitanism" at a time when the traditional world of polis was beginning to be shaken to its foundation and collapse.

It was indeed the time when Macedonian men of power were assuming the hegemony of Mediterranean world; and before long, Alexander the great began to move ahead with his cosmopolitanism in arms, whose all-inclusive and paradigmatic influences reminds us strongly the progression and the prevalence of globalization and its various problematic effects in our era.

It is a noteworthy fact that even at the initial stage of its appearance there were two prominent and antithetically different types of cosmopolitanism. However, in comparison with the strong legacy of Alexander the great which has been transmitted through the Roman empire and the Catholic church, the saying and thought of Diogenes have been so often underestimated, that his cosmopolitanism also has not always been appropriately evaluated. Whenever one speaks about Diogenes' cosmopolitanism, he/she regards it as a shadowy ghost of Alexander's genuine one.

In this paper, following Diogenes' mission "παραξαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα" (defacing the currency) I would like to deface this prevalent and current interpretation and illuminate some significant aspects of Diogenes' cosmopolitanism, which may be helpful to cope with the complicated problems in our global era.