TWO STRANDS OF COSMOPOLITAN 
PAIDEIA

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The principal requirements of the cosmopolitan paideia

I
Arnold Gehlen the German philosophical anthropologist defined human
being (homo) as a “deficient being” (Mangelwesen) who lost his instinct and
had to develop “culture” as a kind of armor for survival. According to him
human being was forced by its physical deficiency of weakness to create
its own second environment, the cultural world (Kulturwelt).1)

It is significant to remember here a fact that Gehlen was not a pioneer
who had an original idea that human being was by nature deficient and
indispensably dependent on culture. Already in antiquity Poseidonius in
Apamea2) proposed such a similar idea. However Poseidonius also was
not a genuine pioneer of this idea. He had his anticipator in the classical
Greece; Protagoras the dramatis personae in Plato’s Protagoras.

At the locus 320c–328d Protagoras the sophist tells a myth of creation
of all animals on the earth; Epimetheus the younger brother of Prometheus
in his creation service entrusted by the Gods creates and distributes the
different kinds of animals so as to ensure the survival of each kind, whereas
he leaves vainly in his final stage human being “unclothed, unshod”; in
a state of “Mängelwesen.” Then Prometheus revised younger brother’s
task and distributed to human being practical wisdom necessary for their
survival; namely the technical knowledge operating fire and of the means
of procuring sustenance. But human beings remained to live as scattered
individuals, defenseless against wild animals’ attack. Therefore in order to
enable them to live together in communities Zeus dispensed to all humans
the innate disposition towards honor (aidos) and justice (dikaion) which was
to be fostered and developed by education (paideia).\(^3\)

The concept of education (paideia) dates back to the beginning of
Greek culture. The myth of Prometheus proclaims the necessity of human
culture as an art (techne, ars) which is to be inherited from generation to
generation through the medium of paideia and humanitas. Thus, the human
being is to be biologically described not only as homo sapiens, homo fabel,
homo oeconomics etc., but also as homo educans. Without education (paideia)
one cannot be a human being.

The Greek word “paideia” (παιδεία) for “education” derived its original
meaning from Greek verb “παιδεύω” (paideuo).\(^4\) To understand legitimately
the essence of Greek educational culture the concept of “paideia” is vitally
significant. Werner Jaeger in his voluminous and famous book Paideia used
the concept of paideia to trace the development of Greek culture from
Homer to Demosthenes.\(^5\) The concept of “paideia” is ab initio inseparable
from one of “τέχνη (techne art)” of education. The “paideia” has long been
regarded as an art (ars) of teaching and learning in Western culture.

It is a significant fact that already in the time of Plato the founder
of Athenian Academy and Isocrates the rhetorician\(^6\) the word “paideia”
had a technical meaning of the “art of education.” In opposition to
Isocrates’ program of civic “paideia”\(^7\) Plato stressed consciously a rather
philosophical “paideia.” For Plato too education was an art (techne) that is
necessary to transmit human culture from generation to generation. But his accent on the “paideia” was laid heavily on philosophical reformation necessary for turning an uneducated person from the darkness to the light; from the inexperienced to the enlightened; from its brutal state to the kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία) (beautiful and good). The “paideia,” for Plato, concerned especially with each citizen’s indwelling power in the soul. Socrates the character in Plato’s Republic VII 518B-C says as follows:

“True analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not convert to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being.”

Socrates at this locus defines “paideia” as “an art (techne)” of the enlightenment based on the assumption that each person’s soul possesses inner vision but “does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.”

The art of enlightenment, for Plato, has to aim principally at the good and the truth. Thus the most important point of “paideia” (art of enlightenment) was, for Plato, to overcome the incommensurable gap between the darkness and the light. But in spite of a fact that Plato always speaks zealously about the necessity of turning away from the visible world (the Many) to the invisible reality (the One), he never tells explicitly when and how this entire soul’s turning from the darkness to the light takes place, except for the metaphorical expressions. In the dialogue Republic, this peculiar situation is compared to “the journey’s end” (τέλος
τῆς πορείας, telos tês poreias), that can be revealed only to “a master of (philosophical) dialectics” who demands an account of the essence of each thing.” The phrase “the journey’s end” should remind us of Diotima’s words about the unspeakable in the dialogue Symposium: Diotima there says that whosoever may have been thus far guided coming now to the end of Erotica will see instantaneously (exaiaphnês) something wonderful, beautiful in its nature. This passage of Symposium, as is well known, has its counterparts in the Phaedrus 249c6, 250a5; the Parmenides 156cff; the Seventh Letter 341c-d.

The “paideia” developed by Plato in the Republic had a special case of philosophical art which was indispensable to foster the prospective guardians in the ideal state. In comparison with the average view of “paideia” in the time, Plato’s thought might be regarded as a heavily authoritarian and anti-democratic.

Platonic just city in the Republic is divided into three classes: the Guardians (phylakes), the Auxiliaries (epikouroi), the third class referred by different names like “workers (demiourgoi),” “the other citizens (alloi politai),” “businessmen (to chrematistikon).” Thanassis Samaras pointed out rightly Plato’s anti-democratic and authoritarian position: “Plato devotes large parts of the Republic to the specification of the Auxiliaries (376c-412b) and the Guardians (502e-541b), but never supplies a single word about the formal education of the Producers.”

II

Plato held a firm antipathy against democratic conception of “paideia,” whereas Athenian people in the time unchangeably regarded it as a traditional art of education of the hereditary Greek culture. According to Werner Jaeger the “paideia” meant “Greek history itself, in all its concrete
reality.\textsuperscript{16} He said also that especially in the time of Plato and Isocrates "paideia" became a new comprehensive conception of the cultural ideal of Greeks.\textsuperscript{17}

The "paideia" among Greek people developed itself originally on a parallel with the cultural prosperity of Greek democracy. The anti-oligarchic constitutional reforms undertaken by Solon (c.638-558 BC) appears to have given common people the power not only to elect officials but also to call them to account, so that he has established the democratic foundations of a true republic.\textsuperscript{18} Then Cleisthenes reformed the constitution of ancient Athens (508/7 BC). He changed Athenian political organization from the four traditional tribes into ten tribes according to their area of residence (deme) which were organized into three groups called trittyes ("thirds"): a city region asty, a coastal region paralia and an inland region mesogeia among ten demes. Then he established legislative bodies run by individuals chosen by lottery which became a true foundation of real democracy. Cleisthenes may have introduced ostracism (first used in 487 BC), whereby a vote from more than 6,000 of the citizens would exile a citizen for 10 years. Whereas he called these reforms isonomia (isovomia equality of political rights), it represented for the reality of demokratia (democracy) based on the direct democracy.\textsuperscript{19} On the parallel with these political reformations the traditional system of aristocratic education based on the Homeric ideals of heroic virtues began to transform into a new form of civil paideia. It attempted to form the citizen for a life of full participation in the wide range of activities worthy of the democratic city. R. Kahn said as follows:

"The result was the mass re-organization of educational activities, their institutionalization, popularization, and conscious association with
the ideals of democratic culture. Beyond the simple training of the youth into pre-formulated expectations, Athenian *paideia* attempted to integrate Athenian children into the broad ideals held by Athens concerning the harmony of body, mind, spirit and polis. The education of the Athenians involved physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and military exercises in the hope that when the initiation into these various cultural domains was complete, the Athenians’ investment in the education of their youth would be honored by the living example of Athens’s democratic legacy at work in a crop of new citizens.”

III

However, it is a noteworthy fact that with these great cultural and political developments Athenian society turned so increasingly mercenary and imperial, that social hierarchies have been re-emerged as predominant and tyrannical power and re-consolidated.

A cleavage in Athenian society between the rich and the poor was increasingly widened. So that economic gaps between the various social classes were also expanded. The traditional federation of Greek city-states began to be fractured. On the parallel with this silt of political circumstance Athenian conception of *paideia* began to decline and transform itself into a kind of anti-democratic style.

Even Plato’s seemingly radical experiment in philosophical thought expressed in his *Republic* may be seen as retrogression that reflects this shift of Athenian political climate. Plato’s philosophical proposal in the *Republic* may be seen in actual fact as a conservative pull back from the inclusive democracy. Plato’s seemingly bold ideas presented in the *Republic* consist of a number of inside contradictions. His thought not only rested upon Athenian foundational contradictions and oppressions based
on slavery, race, class, gender,22) but also his advanced political views at first sight in reality exhibit Plato’s anti-democratic retrogression to the authoritarian politics.

Here I cite the case of his so-called “feminism.” According to Plato’s proposal in the beginning of Republic Book 5 women should not only share men’s tasks but also be admitted as the Guardians in the ideal state. Plato’s this proposal has often been regarded as evidence that Plato was an advanced “feminist.” But it is wrong. Plato in reality was an anti-democratic and anti-feministic thinker. At Republic 563b Socrates the character ironically talks about “the climax of popular liberty”:

“And the climax of popular liberty is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men.”

According to Plato’s view it is wrong that unequal are treated equally and women are naturally inferior to men. Why then were women admitted as the Guardians in Plato’s ideal state? Julia Annas explains as follows:

“The greatest good for a state is unity; the greatest evil, disunity, which leads to disruption and instability. He [Plato] undertakes to show that the system of communal living is the best possible one because it produces the highest degree of unity in a state. A Guardian will regard all his contemporaries as brothers and sisters and have filial feelings to all those of an age to be his and her parents. The Guardians will not be tied to houses and families; all their emotional energy will be
released for service to the state, and will not be wasted in quarrels over individual concerns.”

“Plato is not interested in the rights of women, nor in freeing women (or men) from the bonds of the family. What he is passionately interested in is the prospect of a unified and stable state in which some at least of the citizens work solely for the state’s good. The proposals about women and the family are means to that end. … Plato the feminist is a myth.”

The above mentioned is only a special aspect of Plato’s thought of women’s rights. But it is unquestionable that Plato was an anti-democratic and authoritarian thinker. It is sure that he vigorously criticized the tyrannical politics; but the image of Philosopher-king whom Plato depicted in the Republic and Seventh letter make us visualize faintly the face of Macedonian King whom Demosthenes the Athenian rhetorician attacked vainly with his great rhetorical vigor. In the last period of Plato’s lifetime Athenian political situation was shifting to something cosmopolitan and universal. Thus Athenian democratic paideia too began to transform increasingly to somewhat cosmopolitan type.

Aristotle, Plato’s student and Alexander’s tutor, left an imperialistic guideline to his disciple; a guideline for turning him away from the self-sustained, local democratic city-state towards the expansive control of a colonizing world empire. Alexander the great succeeded substantially his master’s political teaching. They say that Alexander carried with him on his campaign a copy of the Iliad which had been edited by his great teacher. He usually kept it under his pillow together with his dagger; it is the so-called “Iliad out of the box” (ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νάρθηκος). The word “box” (νάρθηκος) is very suggestive, because the box in question was a booty
which Alexander robbed from Darius III the Persian last king. Alexander regarded this copy of *Iliad* as a text book of cosmopolitan *paideia* which usually encouraged him to conquer foreign peoples who stood against Greek (=Macedonian) “advanced culture.”

According to Plutarch in *De Fortuna Alexandri*, Alexander was never “a faithful disciple” of Aristotle. He closed consciously his ears against his teacher’s advices. In conducting himself without regard to his great master’s political thought, Plutarch insists, Alexander could achieve a great thing. “Alexander,” Plutarch says, “did not follow Aristotle’s advice to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader and other peoples as if he were their master.”

Failing to meet his master’s expectations, as Plutarch recognizes, Alexander acknowledged that he was a “κοινός θεόθεν ἀρμοστής” (a heaven-sent universal governor) and a “διαλλακτής τῶν ὀλων” (a mediator of all things); that is to say, a mediator between men and gods.

However Plutarch failed to discern the truth. Who can be qualified as ‘a mediator (reconciler) between men and gods’? What is his logical status? Is it not a “mean proportional” between two extremes, namely a mean proportional between “men” and “gods”? Yes, he must be. Indeed, Alexander positively identified his position in the world as a mean proportional between gods and men. Thus, as you may immediately suspect, the case indicates without fail another fact that Alexander inherited faithfully a vital point of Aristotle’s ethical and political thought. As you know well now, Aristotle identified the essence of “man” as a mean proportional between “god” and “animal:” “God : Man = Man : Animal.” Thus paradoxically betraying Plutarch’s and public estimation, Alexander as a descendant of Achilles the hero in the *Iliad* was really a faithful disciple of Aristotle.

It is true that Alexander’s analogy:
God : Alexander = Alexander : Man
should be regarded as a version that is considerably different from
Aristotelian analogy:

God : Man = Man : Animal.

But, the difference between them consists in the fact that the former is an
extravagantly swollen-headed and paranoiac version of the latter.

Thus Alexander’s march was a sort of “cultural revolution” throughout
the ancient world, with Greek armies involved in the colonizing and
civilizing of barbarous regions, first by appealing to _arms_, then via
cosmopolitan _paideia_ inspired by swollen-headed conqueror’s passion. The
substance of Alexander’s cosmopolitan action is reflected in Alexander’
s famous words in DL6.32: “Had I not been Alexander, I should have
liked to be Diogenes.” The phrase ‘stamp foreign states with the impress of Greek government’ is intolerably
despotic and self-righteous, whereas the sentiment itself attributed to
Alexander by Plutarch, though modified, may have its origin in Isocrates.

Depicting throughout Alexander the Macedonian conqueror as a
philosopher-king who in his action (ἐργαν) surpassed all other philosophers
in words (λόγος) like Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, Plutarch justifies
Alexander’s conquest as follows:

‘Those who were vanquished by Alexander are happier than those
who escaped his hand; for these had no one to put an end to the
wretchedness of their existence, while the victor compelled those
others to lead a happy life:…Thus Alexander’s new subjects would not
have been civilized, had they not been vanquished.’
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Alexander’s cosmopolitan action was, according to Plutarch in his *On the fortune of Alexander*, a realization of “a dream” or “a shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth,” which Zeno of Citium depicted in his *Republic*. According to Plutarch, Alexander was a cosmopolitan philosopher-king in action, who gave effect to this Zeno’s principles and “desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people, so that one law would govern all mankind, and they all would look toward one rule of justice (ἐν δίκαιον) as though toward a common source of light (κοινὸν φῶς).” Such an ideal was a gist of Alexandrian cosmopolitan *paideia* which Alexander the great hallmarked and was inherited to Western world by the medium of Roman *humanitas* mainly introduced by Cicero.

IV

Now, it is a noteworthy fact that even at the initial stage of its appearance there were two seemingly similar but in reality antithetically different strands of cosmopolitanism, therefore also the ideas of cosmopolitan *paideia*; the one originating from Diogenes of Sinope and the other from Alexander the great respectively.

Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412/403-323 B.C.), a philosophical hero, the famous dog philosopher, was not only the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity, but also the first protagonist of cosmopolitanism. Declaring himself a “ἄπολις” (without city), a “ἄοικος” (homeless), and a “κοσμοπολίτης” (citizen of the universe), Diogenes began to preach his “cosmopolitanism” at the time when the traditional world of *polis* was beginning to be shaken at its foundation and collapse. Macedonian men of power were assuming the hegemony of Mediterranean world. And before long, according to Plutarch in *De Fortuna Alexandri*, realizing himself as a “universal divine
governor and reconciler of the all things.” Alexander the great began to move ahead with his cosmopolitanism in arms, whose all-inclusive and paradigmatic influences reminds us strongly the progression and the prevalence of globalization and its various problematic effects in our era.

However, in comparison with the strong legacy of Alexander the great, which has been incessantly transmitted through the tradition of the Roman empire and the Catholic church, the saying and thought of Diogenes have been so often ignored or underestimated that his cosmopolitanism also has been too disdainfully neglected and not always been appropriately estimated. Thus, whenever one speaks about Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, he/she often misunderstands it and immediately regards it as a shadowy ghost of Alexander. However, such a tendency disregards the numerous testimonies that link cosmopolitanism to Diogenes. In this paper, following Diogenes’ mission “παρασάραξον τὸ νόμισμα” (deface the currency!) I want to deface this even now prevalent and current misinterpretation and turn up some significant aspects of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan “paideia,” that may be helpful to discern different complicated problems in our global era and cope with educational blockages.

V

Now let me turn to the topic of cosmopolitan paideia. It is alleged that in speaking on the topic of “Cosmopolitan paideia” one should not miss the name of Martha Nussbaum who is the author of the celebrated essay “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” Boston Review (1994).

Robert Fine and Robin Cohen in the essay “Four Cosmopolitanism Moments” cited Nussbaum’s name as one of the four “moments” of cosmopolitanism: namely (1) “Zeno’s moment” in the ancient world, (2) “Kant’s moment” in the Enlightenment, (3) “Arendt’s moment” in the
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post-totalitarian thought and (4) “Nussbaum’s moment” in the late North American thought. Of course Fine and Cohen know well a fact that whereas it may seem self-evident to select Zeno, Kant and Arendt as main *träger* (bearer) of the key cosmopolitan moments; it may seem to be a little idiosyncratic to choose Martha Nussbaum to exemplify late North American thought on the issue of cosmopolitanism. But they regarded Nussbaum’s project as a useful one because of its productivity and provocation against the bulk of her respondents.

Summarizing the gist of Nussbaum’s essay I would like to criticize some points of Nussbaum’s argument. Then in the following I am developing my conception about the principal requirements of the cosmopolitan *paideia*.

Appealing to Diogenes’ famous words “I am a citizen of the world,” Nussbaum refers to the Cynic/Stoic cosmopolitan vision in order to cope with Rorty’s a rather uncritical patriotism from Nussbaum’s viewpoint. She presents two alternative conceptions of the cosmopolitan curriculum designed for the American students and asks as follows: “Most important, should they be taught that they are above all citizens of the United States, or should they instead be taught that they are above all citizens of a world of human beings, and that, while they themselves happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world of human beings with the citizens of other countries?”

According to Nussbaum what is to be adopted is naturally the latter one which is appropriately to be labeled as “the cosmopolitan education” and which has explicitly its primary origin in the ancient tradition of Cynics and Stoics. Nussbaum does not strictly distinguish between Cynic and Stoic conceptions of “humanity” as well as between “Cynic” and “Stoic” cosmopolitanisms. For Nussbaum they are substantially the same
and indistinguishable. At all events, according to Nussbaum, Stoicism is a developed form of Cynicism and the former subsumes completely the latter. So Diogenes the dog philosopher is decidedly regarded as a protagonist of Stoic world of minds. Thus she could say as follows:

As asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, “I am a citizen of the world.” He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal (Italic by H. Yamakawa) aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politès or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two community (Italic by H. Yamakawa) of human argument and aspiration that “is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun” (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, “we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors” (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiment, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human
being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.

This may be regarded as a powerful argument. But I think it is a rather over-sweeping generalization of Cynic/Stoic conception of human beings. Where did Diogenes explicitly say that all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors? We find such a statement not in Diogenes, but in Plutarch’s On the Fortunes of Alexander where Plutarch attributes it Zeno in his Republic saying that

‘This Zeno wrote, picturing as it were a dream or image of a philosopher’s well-regulated republic, but it was Alexander who gave effect to the theory.’

It is noteworthy that Plutarch’s emphasis is placed on Alexander’s cosmopolitan behavior. Plutarch regards Alexander as a Philosopher king in action. But, it is dubious whether Plutarch’s utterance in this context is acceptable. Malcolm Schofield in The Stoic Idea of the City, the book with Martha Nussbaum’s Foreword, studied critically Plutarch’s text and concluded:

Few today, and probably not even Plutarch when he wrote, believe that Alexander was any sort of philosopher or that his campaigns were conceived in the hope of instituting a single community of all
good men everywhere. It would be odd to place implicit trust in every word of what is said about Zeno’s views when we give no credence at all to what are told about Alexander’s. Nor does the detail of the Plutarch text inspire much confidence in its reliability.\(^{41}\)

If Schofield is right and if the Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism are the same, why is it justifiable to attribute the doctrine of the *universal* community of human beings to Diogenes the Cynics? Historically Alexander was a gigantic adversary of Diogenes. In reality Diogenes consistently endeavored to deface the currency of Alexandrian type of cosmopolitanism.

Nussbaum’s emphasis on the *universality* of Diogenian image of the *kosmou polités* is too rough and even misleading. Why the world citizen has to be characterized as a bearer of the ‘more *universal* aspirations and concerns towards the community of human beings than patriots’? Speaking exactly what does the term “universal” in this context mean? Is it regarded as co-extensive with what the “reason” or the “moral capacity” implies? If it is the case, what kind of “reason” or “capacity” is this? Is this to be characterized as “cosmopolitan reason” or “cosmopolitan moral capacity”? But, what kind of factor does these capacities make “universal” or “cosmopolitan? Here is, it seems to me, an implicit circular argument.

The case becomes clearer when Nussbaum refers to the system of “concentric circles.” She stresses ancient Greek Stoics’ proposal that “we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles.” Therefore, a world citizen, she says, “does not need to give up local identifications.”

The first one is drawn around the self; the next takes in one’s
immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, one’s neighbors or local group, one’s fellow city-dwellers, one’s countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnicities, linguistic, historical, professional, gender and sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, that of humanity as a whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles somehow toward the center” (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, 1st-2nd CE), making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on.

So, according to Nussbaum, one who is to be a world-citizen must start from the “self” as the smallest concentric circle and finally reach at “humanity” as the largest circle. Thus a student who regards herself as defined by her particular loves for her self, her family, her neighbors, her local community etc. must reach at the largest and concentric circle, namely at universal humanity as a whole and finally learn to recognize humanity wherever she encounters it.

The process of this so-called “cosmopolitan education” may be likened to a tournament such as a mock cavalry battle, where a horseman wins a final game and the universal fame. But how could a student proceed in each step from the lowest position at the center toward the outermost universal concentric circle, if she did not yet know beforehand why her family is more universal, valuable and preferable to her “self” ?; generally speaking, if she has not realized beforehand the reason why the outer “y” circle is more universal and preferable to the lower “x” circle?

VI

Today, whenever the cosmopolitanism becomes the topic of a talk, one is apt to have some image of the global state, wherein “a culture of cultures”
or “a universalized (cosmopolitan) culture” beyond various multi-cultures based on the ethnic or national differences will be successfully realized and therefore the serious problems accompanying with the process of globalization also can be dissolved. But, it is doubtful whether it is possible that such a conception about the “cosmopolitanism” to functions as a valid and potent countermeasure against our suspenseful problems. On the contrary, such a conception of cosmopolitanism may degenerate into a mere glorification of a particular culture’s superiority among all other “barbarous” cultures and the campaign based on it. Alexander’s case was such a typical example.

It appears that the cosmopolitan sentiment has its own constitutional inclination to a universal world of human beings which is often and easily visualized by a system of concentric circles. But such an imperial and a rather childish and simple conception will fail at all events. Without presupposing each student’s intrinsic cosmopolitan reason or moral capacity Nussbaum’s education program for the world citizen could not be developed.

Without presupposing the existence of single body of human beings represented as a concentric system of the circles, Nussbaum’s reference to the universality of cosmopolitan paideia may become wholly nonsense. On the other hand, in such a concentric world one could not dwell in co-extensive two communities at the same time. Then Nussbaum’s reference to “two communities” has to become logically fallacious. On the other hand Nussbaum’s way of view regarding Stoic concept of the “world-citizen” too appears to be biased. Her way of view based on Seneca, Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius etc. mirrors only one side of the conception of the “world citizen” (cosmopolitēs).
According to my view there were at least four principal types of cosmopolitanism in the Roman period: namely those of A, E, I, and O type cosmopolitanism. In my previous paper ‘Cynic Justice,’ to exemplify the circumstances, I have taken Marcus Aurelius, Tertullianus, Augustinus, and the Donatists as the representatives of four cosmopolitan types in the Roman period.\textsuperscript{45} Here I make a reproduction of the argument shortly. The following logical diagram shows the traditional “square of opposition” by which four types of cosmopolitanisms can be aptly classified.

(1) \textit{A} type: Presupposing that the Universe (=the universal state) \((y)\) comprises his country Rome \((x)\), Marcus said: ‘my nature is rational and civic; my city and country, as Antoninus, is Rome; as a man, the Universe.’ Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor of the Roman Empire, lived in his country Rome; but Rome was, for him, only a small part of the universe, which was for him a single and genuine common state, wherein the whole human race could be “fellow-members.”\textsuperscript{46}

(2) \textit{E} type: Contrary to the \textit{A} type Tertullianus the apologist advocated the radical divorcement from the Roman Empire. He said decisively: ‘Nothing is more foreign (\textit{aliena}) to us than the State (\textit{publica}). One state we know, of which all are citizens—the universe (\textit{mundus}).\textsuperscript{47} According to Tertullian, there was no intersection between “\textit{publica}” (=Rome \(x\)) and “\textit{mundus}” (the universe =kingdom of God \(y\)); similarly there was
no intersection between “Athens” and “Jerusalem” as well as between “Academia” and “ecclesia.” These utterances of Tertullian clearly points to the type $E$ cosmopolitanism together with $O$ type cosmopolitanism, which Augustine as a “peregrinus” had to deny thoroughly.

(3) $I$ type: Augustine’s stance may be identified with that of “the eschatological cosmopolitanism.” It has a double mission. On the one hand, in relation to the Roman Empire (x), he behaved as an impartial “peregrinus;” though on the other hand, in relation to the various heretics and schismatics like Manichaeans, Arians, Pelagians and Donatists, he behaved as a rigorous Catholic bishop, who advocated the necessity of “universus orbis Christianus (y).” Namely, on the one hand Augustine as a “peregrinus” remained thoroughly within saeculum, namely in the intersection between civitas Dei and civitas terrena (the type $I$ cosmopolitanism) (xy); but on the other hand, as a Catholic bishop he advocated the all-inclusive universal cosmopolitanism (Type $A$) and suppressed the heretics and the schismatics like Donatists (Type $O$) rigorously.

(4) $O$ type: Donatists in North Africa had a program of social revolution combined with eschatological hopes. The Donatists regarded their church (y) as a suffering people and to be separated from the world (x). They believed that the church should not rely on state power or patronage, whereas resistance was acceptable and martyrdom following a life of penance was the goal of the religiously minded. Donatists were the schismatics who separated themselves from Roman government and Catholic Church.

In the above-mentioned four types of cosmopolitanism Augustine’s dual stance may perplex us. Why Augustine had to adopt such a dual position? The elucidation of his circumstances explains a paradigmatic mechanism of interrelationship between four types of cosmopolitanism.
(i) Pay attention to the fact that the type $I$ (Augustinian Cosmopolitanism) is a logical consequence of the type $A$ (Marcus Aurelius, Ambrosius, Eusebius etc.); the $I\neg y$ is implied by the $A\neg y$, only if “$x$” is not empty; therefore the type $I$ cosmopolitanism presupposes the type $A$ cosmopolitanism.

(ii) The type $I$ (Augustinus) is in contradiction to the type $E$ (Tertullianus, Cyprianus etc.); in addition to this, the type $O$ (Donatists) is a logical consequence of the type $E$ (Tertullianus); and the $O\neg y$ is implied by the $E\neg y$, only if “$x$” is not empty; therefore, in order to be consistent with its own standpoint the type $I$ (Augustinus) must deny the type $E$ (Tertullianus).

(iii) The type $A$ (Marcus Aurelius, Ambrosius etc.) is straightly in contradiction to the type $O$ (Donatists); thus, in order to be consistent with its own standpoint, the type $I$ (Augustinus) in cooperation with the type $A$ (Marcus Aurelius, Ambrosius etc.) has to thoroughly deny the type $O$ (Donatists) cosmopolitanism.

Of course there may be many other variations of the above-mentioned four types of cosmopolitanisms. This state of affairs rejects legitimately Nussbaum’s stance. It is obvious that she has dogmatically in mind only one type among them: the type $A$ cosmopolitanism.

It is a noteworthy fact that the above-mentioned general pattern of cosmopolitanism in the Roman period, as you know now, can be visualized by an image of ellipse with two foci, and not by a circle. Ponder a little while on the cultural phenomenon’s actual state. It is rather something analogous to a magnetic field which has two electric terminals or to the solar system which Kepler and Newton successfully explicated. According to Kepler’s first law, each planet moves around the sun in an elliptical
orbit.\(^{(48)}\) His revolutionary findings of the planetary motion led directly to Newton's law of universal gravitation. Thanks to them we came to understanding of the reason why the orbits of planetary motions are elliptical one which has two foci.\(^{(49)}\)

It is a noteworthy fact that with their discoveries the privileged status of circle as a traditional paradigm of astronomy to which even Copernicus too adhered is gone, and in place of this the ellipse as a new paradigm of planetary motion with two foci made an appearance.\(^{(50)}\)

Similarly, it is obvious that a cultural phenomenon too can be regarded as a unity with two foci at least. For example a religious phenomenon is conceivable as a single unity with two poles of the "sacred" and the "profane" which function invariably as a pair\(^{(51)}\) albeit the way of their composition and location varies differently. The circumstances are analogous to the cases of planetary motion. The shape of the planetary motion is changed in conformity with the location of two foci. The greater the distance between the two foci, the more elongated the ellipse. Its ultimate form is a straight line. The shorter the distance between the two foci, the more thickened the ellipse and becomes nearly a circle.\(^{(52)}\) The privileged status given to the circle had to be cancelled. Remember here the Diogenes' way of life. Like Jesus Christ who lived based on Galilean district in Palestine and preached the coming kingdom of Heaven, Diogenes
the dog philosopher too lived at Athens or Corinth alternately preaching the coming cosmopolitan or cosmic state.

VII

Now it is time to unveil more explicitly the identity of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism. Let remember Alexander’s utterance: “I must alter the standard of coinage and stamp foreign states with the impress of Greek government.” The word “Greek government” in this context functions as a flag mark of the Greek government writ large, under which “all human beings should be members of the same people and fellow citizens, and hence also there should be one way of life and one cosmos.” Alexander as a mediator for the whole world justified under this flag mark his acts of warfare and insisted that every foreign state (x) should be compelled to depend on the Greek government writ large (y). Thus, he continued to conquer the foreign states “by force of arms” (τοῖς ὑπλοῖς βιωζόμενος).

However, here, it is significant to remember a fact that Diogenes’ immediate adversary was not Alexander in reality but Aristotelian worldview based on his definition of human beings. We must reconfirm a fact that for Aristotle Diogenes was only a homeless (ἄοικος), a city-less fellow (ἄπολις) who was a “natural outcast” having no part of city-state (οὐθέν μέρος πόλεως), so that he was nothing but a “beast” (θηρίον).

Now, let us return to the scene where Diogenes answered someone’s ridiculous question “where did you come from?” with the word “I am a citizen of the universe.” It is clear that the questioner’s true motive was to indicate his intention of excluding Diogenes (the non-citizen) from the polis.

The gist of his utterance may be expressed as follows: “No non-citizen is a member of the polis” or “every non-citizen is a non-member of the polis.” In order to give a counterattack to this mischievous question
and “deface” its validity (=the currency: *nomisma*). Diogenes, in the first place, had to voluntarily acknowledge that he was a “non-citizen.” Then, which part of the class “non-citizen” did he wish to belong to? In due consideration of the fact that Diogenes lived as an “ἀοικος” in the domain of “τὰ ἴδια” like Socrates, we may conclude that he took his position in the domain β, which may be regarded as a fringe area of the polis, where the different cultures and different peoples could hold the intersectional part in common.53)

Why then does he belong to the domain of “τὰ ἴδια”? It is because of a fact that Diogenes was such an “*agathos daimon*” (ἀγαθός δαίμων) who at the same time was a “parasite” and a “denunciator” of the urban society.54) He was, according to Plutarch, a “*catascopos*” (κατάσκοπος=spy) upon the insatiable greed of the men of power;55) and a reconciler between “nomos” (νόμος=convention) and “physis” (φύσις=nature).56) In order to deface the “currency” of the established “nomoi” (νόμοι) and advocate his cosmopolitanism, Diogenes could not entrench himself like Donatists in the domain α, but had to dwell in the inner part of the polis. However, such a lifestyle was possible only in the metropolitan areas like Athens or Corinth.57)

※ N: Non-citizen; P: Polis

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As a matter of fact, the original birthplace of Cynicism was the Athenian society. Speaking more exactly, it was born in a public sphere (the domain $\beta = \koinon$) of the Athenian society. In contrast to another public sphere of “δημόσιος” (“$\gamma = \text{πρόν}'$” = political mainstay of Athens), the domain $\beta$ was a “κοινόν” in the level of everyday life, which was principally opened for every resident of the polis. It was also a traffic circle, where the exiles like Diogenes, the mercenaries, the raiders, the physicians, the builders, the sculptors, the courtesans, the cooks, the philosophers, the traders and the actors incessantly came and went, and the different vivid news and information were abundantly exchanged. In contrast with the official domain $\gamma$, it was a kind of brewing laboratory, where the various “invisible” politics and association activities were informally developed and organized. Thus, in itself it was already an archetypal domain, from where the true “cosmopolis” ($\kosmopolite$) could make its appearance.

VIII

Standing on this spot $\beta$, Diogenes of Sinope uttered the phrase “I am a citizen of the cosmos” ($\kosmopolite$) and tried to deface the currency of Aristotelian conception of the “political animal” and “the proportional logic” lurking behind his theory of justice. In the beginning of the Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle said:

In regard to justice ($\deltaikaiosunh$) and injustice ($\adikia$), we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense the justice is a mean ($mesotis$), and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean ($meson$).
Aristotle’s concern for the “μεσότης” (mean) and the “αὐτάρκεια” (self-sufficiency) is derived from his fundamental assumption that the stability in a society is good, achievable, and is the basic aim of all political and economic arrangements. From such a viewpoint, a disturbance such as faction and civil war between the “rich” and the “poor” was to be regarded as the most suspenseful matters, which might radically undermine the traditional solidarity of the citizen body.

It is notable that the propertied citizens in that time extensively held such a concern for the traditional solidarity of the citizen body in common. When Aristotle returned to Athens under the financial protection of Alexander the great and was giving the lecture of proto-Politics to his students in the Lyceum (from the 335/334 BC), everywhere in Greek world, there were severe struggles for land between the rich and the poor citizens. The poor citizens’ main demand, then, was “redistribution of the land,” against which the propertied citizens had to live every day in constant uneasiness and economical fear. Such being the case, when Greek cities were united in the so-called League of Corinth (338-337 BC) under the leadership of Philip II, who was the father of Alexander and probably an intimate friend of Aristotle, all the cities enlisted under Pax Macedonica swore an oath for “the universal peace” (κοινὴ εἰρήνη) in compensation for the renunciation of their freedom and autonomy, the aim of which was a preparation to use force against cities violated the status quo and not to permit land redistribution, debt cancellation, unlawful confiscations, or manumission of slaves for revolutionary purposes.

Just at this point of the time, we should say, the traditional city-states in most of the Hellenic world suffered in a decisive way a loss of political freedom and autonomy. They were no longer true democratic independent city-states, but only the dependencies obliged to act in concert with each
other under the hegemony of Macedonian power. Thus, the citizen body in Greek city-states lost its substance and became the shadow of the former figure. Nevertheless, there was no program that dared to appeal to the cooperation with outsiders of the citizen body.\(^7\) On the contrary, the citizens of the “large private clubs with closed membership” (=Greek governments)\(^7\) clung obstinately to their vested rights and thoroughly ignored the welfare of non-citizens, whom Aristotle regarded as “the things that are indispensables.” That is to say, they were, according to Aristotle, “necessary,” to be sure, yet only the “appurtenance.”

In the Aristotelian best regime, all individuals who are women, *metoikoi*, slaves, and almost all productive laborers could not hope to have share in the legislation (νομοθέτησις) of their happy life.\(^7\) Aristotle regards the laboring class not only as fellows who are “ignoble” and “inimical to virtue,” but also as fellows who are never worthy of having a share of the common advantage which should exclusively be distributed among the citizens, whereas “the most nobly constituted polis” necessarily aims at “the most supreme of all goods.”\(^7\)

Viewed from Diogenes’ standpoint the so-called justice in the Aristotelian best regime did not deserve at all the name of justice.\(^7\) Its substance was nothing but injustice. In such a social context Diogenes lived based on his double-sided cosmopolitan operations. He intended not only to radically deface the currency of Aristotelian politico-social philosophy so as to overthrow the traditional backbone of the domain of δημόσιος, but also to live well like Socrates, who was already substantially a cosmopolitan and who urged everyone, irrespective of citizen or foreigner,\(^7\) to realize their ignorance and conveyed his philosophical mission of τὸ ἐν ζήν. It is a noteworthy fact that the substance of the “short road to virtue (σύντομος ἐπὶ ὀρθὴν ὁδὸς)\(^7\) which Diogenes advocated was really a cosmopolitan way
of life.

The logical implication of the above mentioned may be formulated as follows: once being nullified the Aristotelian world-view, the interrelationship between the class “non-citizen” and the class “polis” in the above-mentioned diagram would be transformed into that of \( |P \cap N|' \); and if we may take \( N \) to be an intersection between \( N \) itself and the universe \( (\Omega) \) and call this afresh the “cosmopolis” \( (K) \), then the above formula \( |P \cap N|' \) will become equivalent to that of \( |P \cap K|' \); thus it will entails the statement “every member of the polis \( (P) \) belongs to the cosmopolis \( (K) \).”

IX

Is this cosmopolitanism the same as Alexander’s? No, it is not the case. Rethink on the circumstances where every foreign state incorporated into the Alexander’s cosmopolis in arms was obliged to serve as a “subject” in “the Greek government writ large.”\(^{77} \) The notorious practice of “proscynesis” (προσκύνησις=obeisance) which Alexander introduced and forced to all of his subjects shows the state of affairs symbolically.\(^{78} \)

In contrast with this, Diogenes pointed to a political order which was not only anti-authoritarian, democratic, and ecological, but also humanistic so as to recognize the common humanity. The naturalism and the spiritual animalism lurking behind his cosmopolitanism implies a positive attitude to the natural world including the whole world of living things and recognized a cooperative order (δομονοία) that transcends the conventional barriers between human societies.

Diogenes correlated this cooperative and ecological order with three concepts of freedom, equality, and friendship.

(1) Freedom: Diogenes asserted that the reciprocity of freedom is the most fundamental bond among people; when he was asked by
somebody what was the most beautiful thing in human world (τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις) Diogenes replied: “παρρησία” (‘Freedom of speech,’ DL6.69). The reciprocity of freedom presupposes the Kantian respect for other persons. On the other hand when someone was extolling the good fortune of Callisthenes and saying what splendor he shared in the suite of Alexander, said Diogenes, “not so, but rather ill fortune; for he breakfasts and dines when Alexander thinks fit.” (DL6.45) There is no reciprocity of freedom among people in Alexandrian cosmopolis.

(2) Equality: Diogenes asserted that in order to be a citizen of the universe (κοσμοπολίτης, DL6.63) people must share with the “like-mindedness” (ὁμόνοια) each other, in other words people must have equivalent right and status. He ridiculed good birth and fame and all such distinctions among people calling them “showy ornaments of vice” (προκοσμηματα κακίας, DL6.72). According to Plutarch the prevalence of virtue and “like-mindedness” among people was the basis of Diogenes’ polis. This kinship has a potentiality which transcends the conventional barriers between men and women and between races. For all human beings have an equal share in the gifts of nature. On the other hand one cannot expect such a like-minded relation among Macedonian men of power. Perdicas once threatened to put Diogenes to death unless he came to him (DL6.44). Similarly Alexander threatened him with the words: ‘Are you not afraid of me?’ (οὐ φοβῇ με;) Thus, there is no equality among Macedonian men of power.

(3) Friendship: Diogenes asserted that the friendship (φιλία) and affinity (ὁμοιότης) is the basis of association. On somebody declaring that his own friends were plotting against him, Diogenes exclaimed, ‘What is to be done then, if you have to treat friends and enemies alike.’ (DL6.68) He used to say that ‘we ought to stretch out our hands to our friends with
the fingers open and not closed.' (DL6.29) Friends are to be welcomed with open-mindedness so as to share all property in common’ each other (DL6.72). Thus, in the famous Syllogism Diogenes the beggar uttered: ‘All things belong to the gods. The wise men are friends of the gods. Friends hold things in common. Therefore all things belong to the wise men.’ (DL6.37)

The above-mentioned syllogism has been uttered by him on the occasion of his request for charity. Considering such a situation it becomes clear that “the wise men” (οἱ σοφοί) are beggars or their equivalents like homeless persons, prostitutes, tax collectors who make their appearances in the *Synoptic Gospels.* You should pay attention to Diogenian way of life by *paracharattein.* Most people are, according to Diogenian way of thought, so nearly mad that a finger makes all the difference (DL6.35) and ‘disabled’ (ἀνάπηροι DL6.33). But the word ‘disabled’ (ἀνάπηροι) in this context ought to be applied not to the “deaf” or “blind” and so on, but to those who “have no beggar’s bag” (μὴ ἔχοντας πήραν, DL6.33). Therefore, “the wise men” (οἱ σοφοί) in the above-mentioned syllogism mean no other than the bottom class people. On the other hand the tyrants like Alexander or Dionysius treat their friends as a mere means to an end. Asked how Dionysius treated his friends Diogenes replied: “Like purses; so long as they are full he hangs them up, and when they are empty he throws them away” (DL6.50). Therefore there is no genuine friendship among tyrants like Macedonian men of power.

Based on these principles Diogenes could conclude that Macedonian cosmopolis is a fake currency. Thus in place of Alexander’s cosmopolis Diogenes’ one will make its appearance in the market place. However it is regrettable that we have only a scanty *testimonia* referring to Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism. Diogenes’ text, even if it were survived, would not be an argument (λόγος) but a kind of story (μυθος), which provably was
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humorously described in its conception as well as in its expression; it might be a kind of “σπουδαίο γέλοιον” (seriocomic), the popular style of which was originated from the old Comedy and the satyr play.⁸⁶ In addition to this, concerning its concrete expression too, we cannot rely on Diogenes’ own depiction. But, according to the phrasing of Crates who was an immediate disciple of Diogenes, it might be a polis called “Beggar’s bag” (Pera).

There is a city Pera in the midst of wine dark vapour,
Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owing naught,
Into which sails nor fool nor parasite
Nor glutton, slave of sensual appetite,
But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,
For which things’ sake men fight not each with other,
Nor stand to arms for money or for fame.⁸⁷

This “Beggar’s bag,” wherein ‘men fight not each with other (οὐ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους), nor stand to arms for money (οὐχ διὰ κέκτημα περὶ κέρματος) or for fame (οὐ περὶ δόξης),’ without fail, immediately reminds us Plato’s description of the “polis of minimum indispensables” (ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις), the so-called “polis of pigs” (υδόν πόλις),⁸⁸ which Socrates affectionately called “the healthy” (ὑγιής) and “the true polis” (ἀληθινή πόλις).⁸⁹

It is indeed a peaceful polis, where people know neither “poverty” nor “war.”⁹⁰ Thus, because of its frugality and “self-sufficiency,” it should be regarded as a reversed figure of Alexander’s cosmopolis in arms. Therefore, it is proper to be called “Alexander’s Cosmopolis μακρόμενος” or “Madden Alexandrian cosmopolis.” Thus, substituting the “animal” for the tertium comparationis of Aristotelian analogy “God : Man = Man : Animal”
and uttering boldly a word “κοσμοπολίτης” (cosmopolitan), Diogenes of Sinope, the notorious dog philosopher, advocated that ‘the only true government is that which is in the cosmos.’ And so doing, he was defacing the currency of the traditional world-order decisively and made the first step toward the creation of “true,” “peaceful,” and “healthy” cosmopolis, wherein all human beings could be fellow citizens and attain their freedom and happiness.

X

Thus, to live as a true cosmopolitan is to live his/her multiple situations of life; that is to say, to live positively a tension between multiple states of affairs. In other words the cosmopolitanism is among all a way of life, which is not always conflict with anyone’s patriotism. Here I have especially in mind Socrates’ way of life.

At first remember Socrates’ figure in Plato’s Crito who is a patriot and has a strong affection for Athens. Socrates could not bring himself to part a single day from his beloved Athens. That is why, according to almost all scholars’ interpretations, Socrates declines the opportunity to escape which Crito is offering him.91

Under the name of the laws of Athens, he asks himself and Crito who is desperately talking him into breaking prison:

He who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilized men? And if you do this will your life be worthy of living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and
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the laws are the most precious things to men?\(^{92}\)

The only one thing worthy of discussion was, for Socrates, how we can accomplish to living well (τὸ ἀληθῆ).\(^{93}\) And the subject “to live well” was, for Socrates, utterly unconceivable without its relevance to justice and the laws of Athens,\(^{94}\) wherein he was born, nurtured and educated.\(^{95}\) Thus, it might be the case that Socrates’ conception of justice is not always universal. Its validity seems to have remained in the framework of his beloved Athens. Hence his thought also might be irrelevant to the cosmopolitanism which in any way points to something universal.

However, is this Socrates the same person as that Socrates in Apology, who was going about, searching and at the god’s behest investigating anyone, whether citizen or foreigner (καὶ τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τῶν ξένων)?\(^{96}\) And is this Socrates, who rejects jail breaking because of his prospect of the inability to discuss about virtue and justice and lawful things, the same person as that Socrates in Apology, who presumed the case of exile as his own penalty, and who spoke as follows:

[If I were exiled from Athens,] a fine life I should lead … wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here (ἐὰν γὰρ οἶδ’ ὅτι, ὅποι ἄν ἐλθὼ, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὀσπερ ἐνθάδε)?\(^{97}\)

By saying that ‘well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here,’ Socrates in Apology makes it an ipso fact that his philosophical activity must be universally valid; therefore virtues themselves also are universal and do not have frontiers. Or do you
think that Phaedo’s commenting word on Socrates “the most righteous man” (δικαιότατος) in the end of the dialogue *Phaedo* only a currency (νόμισμα) of Athens, notwithstanding this patent fact that Phaedo the commentator himself was a foreigner, a native of Elis and a companion of Socrates.²⁹⁹

No, such a supposition is ridiculous. Socrates’ declination of jail breaking in *Crito* is not because of his patriotism, but mainly because of his deliberation of a discordant and disreputable situation, where a person who has obeyed the laws of fatherland turns suddenly his face into a shameless destroyer of them. The laws in *Crito* say as follows:

You are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us.¹⁰⁰

As the context in *Crito* tells us, if Socrates wished to be exiled he might have offered exile as his penalty,¹⁰¹ although in reality he did not. But, suppose that the official penalty proposed by Meletus against Socrates was originally “exile.” In such a case, whether he liked it or not Socrates eventually would have to be exiled from Athens.

Then, he would have been necessitated to become a “ἀπολίς, ἀοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος” wandering from city to city. Nevertheless, as a “ἰδιώτης” he could have continued to exhort and convey his philosophical mission of “τὸ ἐν ἔκ ὀν,” ‘urging and reproaching each one’ of foreigners ‘everywhere the whole day long,’¹⁰³ albeit he were separated from the domain of “δημόσιος.” For the world of “τὰ ἴδια”¹⁰⁴ is a public space, which may be regarded as a kind of Husserlian *Lebenswelt*, and which is principally opened for all individuals in the state, and has no frontiers.¹⁰⁵
Socrates lived in such a public space, from where the new cosmopolitanism would begin to make its appearance. According to Epictetus he was genuinely a cosmic man (κόσμιος). When asked to what country he belonged, he neither said “I am an Athenian” nor “I am a Corinthian” but “I am a citizen of the universe.” The episode in itself may be a fiction reproduced by someone who was well informed about the original chreia recorded in DL6.63 which Nussbaum quoted in the beginning of her essay. In any way, however, it is irrefutable that for Epictetus Socrates and Diogenes were the very counterparts of each other. In addition to this we should remember a fact that Socrates met his death penalty calmly because of his strong sense of universal justice, not only because of his affection for Athens.

A cosmopolitan, or a world-citizen is, as I see it, defined as a person who has a strong sense of universal justice based on his thorough egalitarianism. In order to be a citizen of the cosmos (κοσμοπολίτης, DL6.63) people must share with the “like-mindedness” (ὁμόνοια) each other, in other words people must have equivalent human rights. Diogenes ridiculed good birth and fame and all such distinctions among people calling them “showy ornaments of vice” (προκοσμηματα κακίας, DL6.72). The prevalence of virtue and “like-mindedness” among people was the basis of Diogenian cosmopolis. This kinship has a potentiality which transcends the conventional barriers between men and women and between races. For all human beings have an equal share in the gifts of nature.

Diogenes was a true egalitarian who denounced radically the contemporary slavery, whereas Aristotle in the Politics defended it eagerly. The fact is not always well-known. Therefore it deserves to be mentioned, because the equality of all human beings is to be the basis of cosmopolitan paideia.
According to an anecdote (DL 6.74) in his traveling to Aegina Diogenes was captured by pirates under the command of Scirpalus. Having been led away to a Cretan slave market and put up for sale as a slave and forbidden to sit down, he shouted: “οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἵχθους ὁποῖς κέοιντο πιπρᾶσκεσθαι.” (It makes no difference, for in whatever position fishes lie, they still find purchasers.)¹¹² I take this as a knockdown blow against the current reality of slavery.

You may regard my phrase “a knockdown blow against the slavery” as an overstatement. But I state a fact just as it is. Be careful to the Diogenes’ use of the phrase “in whatever position fishes lie” (ὁποῖς κέοιντο) and the reason why Diogenes refers to the “fishes” lying at their pleasure. In his reference to “fishes”, I believe, he could aptly denounce the fictitiousness of the slavery. At all events every fish in the fish market will be purchased regardless their attitudes or positions or appearances. It is utterly ridiculous that a fish standing on the right side is noble, free and to be praised or patted, whereas another fish lying on the left side is vulgar, slavish and to be punched. A fish is a fish and remains to be equal to a companion fish. There is no intrinsic difference between them.¹¹³ This is, I believe, the gist of Diogenes’ reference to “fishes.”

Diogenes’ utterance in question is, in my analysis,¹¹⁴ equivalent to the following denunciation of the slavery: “The rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature. The distinction between slave and free man exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.”¹¹⁵

Aristotle counterattacked this denunciation against the slavery and defended at length his theory of the “natural slave.”¹¹⁶ However, as I have described in my article ‘Political Animal’ it is obvious that all of what Aristotle dilated on the “natural slave” was substantially a malicious fiction

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¹¹² 数字が含まれている箇所
¹¹³ 数字が含まれている箇所
¹¹⁴ 数字が含まれている箇所
¹¹⁵ 数字が含まれている箇所
¹¹⁶ 数字が含まれている箇所
sanctioned by Aristotle himself.

(1) Aristotle’s conception of the natural slave conflicts with his own definition of “man.” According to Aristotle, what makes one person a man lies in the fact that “he alone of the animals possesses logos (speech, reason).” Nevertheless Aristotle insists that a slave does not possess “logos” in question. Then, Aristotle insists, it necessarily follows that a slave who does not possess logos is not a man.

(2) The natural slave is, according to Aristotle, defined as a “human being” who “is designed by nature for subjection” and who is only a “living tool” (ἐμψυχον ὁργανον). A master and a slave have nothing in common, because of a fact that the relation between them is analogous to the relation between a craftsman and his tool; or between the soul and the body. There can be no human relationship between a craftsman and his tool. The natural slave is thus likened to “inanimate tool” (ἀψυχος ὁργανον). But, the concept of “ἐμψυχον ὁργανον” (literally, a tool which has the soul) is a contradiction itself, because the adjective “ἐμψυχον” (animate) clearly implies the “soul” (ψυχη).

(3) According to Aristotle, the natural slave is defined as “a human being who belongs by nature not to himself but to another.” Such a human being is “an article of property,” and “an article of property is an instrument for action separable from its owner.” Thus a slave who belongs to his owner is not only a “tool,” but also a “property” (κτήμα) which does not have any “deliberative part” (το βουλευτικόν) of the soul. However, without “deliberation” there can be no virtuous life, because the “deliberation” concerns about “things that contributes to the ends and the exercise of the excellences (virtues) is concerned with these things.” Therefore, the slaves have nothing to do with the exercise of the excellences. But, Aristotle at Politics 1260a33-35 insists that “the slave is
useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much excellence (virtue) as will prevent him from failing in his function through cowardice or lack of self-control.” Here again there is an incurable inconsistency and a cross talk between “a property which has nothing to do with the exercise of the excellences” and “a human being who requires a minimum excellence.”

(4) Aristotle at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1161a30 ff. says that there can be no justice and friendship between a master and a slave, because there is nothing common to ruler and ruled. But Aristotle at *Politics* 1255b13-14 says that “there is a certain common interest and friendship between slave and master in cases when they have been qualified by nature for those positions.” Furthermore at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1161b2-6 Aristotle adds a comment on the friendship between a master and a slave as follows: “Neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool is a lifeless slave. Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can.” But this is a hypocritical saying, because according to Aristotle the natural slave does not possess the reason (*logos*); and one who does not possess reason (*logos*) is not a human being. Aristotelian qualification of a natural slave as a man “qua man” is hopelessly hypercritical.

(5) I have to mention Aristotle’s will which is recorded in Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, V. 11-12, where he wants to set free seven slaves at least after his death. Then, why does he want to do so? What intention does he have in so doing? Should we discern Aristotle’s human touch or philanthropy to slaves? But how can the philanthropy in question be consistent with his public words about the natural slave? Did Aristotle at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1161a30 ff. not insist that there can be
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no friendship between a master and a slave? And did Aristotle’s remarks about the friendship between a master and a slave not be hypercritical and self-righteous? Was it not the case that a master and a slave who are unable to exist without one another had naturally the same interest in the rule-ruled relation? And was it not the case that such a natural union between natural ruler and natural slave was \textit{naturally} right and just? Was it not also the case that a natural slave was the one who was designed by nature to be ruled by a master? Is it not contrary to a slave’s interest to be set free from master? Then why did Aristotle intend to emancipate the domestic slaves from his hand? At \textit{Economics} 1344a23-31 we find out a Peripatetic answer:

“Of possessions, that which is the best and the worthiest subject of economics comes first and is most essential—I mean, man. It is necessary therefore first to provide oneself with good slaves. Now slaves are of two kinds, the overseer and the worker. And since we see that methods of education produce a certain character I the young, it is necessary when one has procured slaves to bring up carefully those to whom the higher duties are to be entrusted. The intercourse of a master with his slaves should be such as to allow them to be neither insolent nor uncontrolled. To the higher class of slaves he ought to give some share of honor, and to the workers abundance of nourishment.”

Now it became obvious that “freedom as a reward” set before the slaves at \textit{Politics} 1330a33 corresponded to the measure that ‘allow them to be neither insolent nor uncontrolled’ at \textit{Economics} 1344a29-30. Thus Aristotelian “natural slave” syndrome was eventually only a political
sophism, namely a “nomisma” ( “money” or an “artificial product” ) in its substance, which was issued by Aristotle himself.\textsuperscript{117}

XI

In opposition to Aristotelian conception of natural order Cynic philosopher had a different and very positive conception of the cosmic order. I would like to quote John L. Moles’ five proofs to show that Cynic cosmopolitanism had positive implications.\textsuperscript{118} Presenting an outline of Cynic cosmological view he says as follows:

The cosmos consists of the earth and heavens; on the earth, there is both animate and inanimate nature; animate nature consists of human beings and animals; human beings consist of Cynics and non-Cynics, Greeks and barbarians, men and women; the heavens contain the heavenly bodies and the gods who live in them.\textsuperscript{119}

Presupposing this overview of Cynic cosmological matrix he went on to confirm that the early Cynics [especially Diogenes and Crates] expressed (1) a positive allegiance to the whole earth and all mankind and (2) a positive attitude to the natural world and all its riches as opposed to the world of polis, therefore also (3) a positive attitude to the animal world and recognized (4) the kinship or community of the wise or “like-mindedness” (\textit{homonoia}) and considered that (5) this kinship transcends the conventional barriers between men and women and between the races, so that they recognized (6) “friendship” and “affinity” between the animate and the inanimate and between gods and men so as to recognize the common humanity.\textsuperscript{120}
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Then Moles referred to the problem of originality of Cynic cosmopolitanism and insisted as follows:

“On my interpretation, Cynic cosmopolitanism influenced Stoic cosmopolitanism far more than current opinion recognizes. The Cynics did not bequeath to the Stoics a purely negative concept to which the latter added a positive value: rather, Cynic cosmopolitanism already contained all the essential positive qualities that the Stoics endowed with a fuller exposition, and that they integrated into a fully developed physical system.”

I feel sympathy with the above mentioned Moles’ view about Cynic cosmopolitan conception, whereas his justification of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism appealing to Plutarch’s ‘On the fortune of Alexander’ is totally misleading and unacceptable.

Now presupposing the above mentioned framework of Cynic cosmology, finally, I would like to make a brief reference to the principle of “equality” which is a key concept of Cynic cosmopolitanism, because cosmopolitanism is based on the inherent dignity and human rights due to the equality of all human beings.

Here returning again to Martha Nussbaum’s argument of cosmopolitanism in the above mentioned article I shall refer to her insistence upon the “accident” event. Probably having J. Rawls’ theory of the “veil of ignorance” in mind Nussbaum wrote as follows:

The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation … We should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender
to erect barriers between us and fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity whenever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity ... 

This argument, I think, may legitimately be counted also as an applied version of Diogenes’ stance to the “contingency” at DL 6.38:

At all events he (Diogenes) was “without a city-state, without a house, without a fatherland, a beggar, a wanderer with a single day’s bread.” But he claimed that to contingency (τύχη) he opposed courage (θάρσος), to convention (νόμος) nature (φύσις), to passion (πάθος) reason (λόγος).

A focal point in the above quoted sentence lies in the concept of “contingency (τύχη),” because it corresponds to the “accident” to which Nussbaum referred.\(^2\) What is the essence of fortune or accident? Is it not the contingency? Diogenes firmly believed that there should be a natural and genuine law on which a cosmopolitan ideal is based (DL6.72), where the conventional barriers between men and women, between citizens and non-citizens, and between different races are to be legitimately abolished. And he defined this law as the equality. The equality was, for Diogenes, a cardinal principle on which such a cosmopolitan society should be based.

Diogenes’ insightful reference to “contingency” (τύχη) has a pivotal significance. The original “contingency” does, according to Kuki Syuzo the Japanese philosopher,\(^3\) define essentially the existence of humankind and conditions our human life on the earth in various critical situations.

Due consideration about this may lead us to a deep realization of original and absolute contingency of all things in the universe. It is interesting that in the Genesis 3-19 in the Old Testament (New
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International Version) we can witness the following expression:

“By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food until you return to the ground, since from it you were taken; for dust you are and to dust you will return.”

My point here lies in the above expression “for dust you are and to dust you will return.” Referring to the old Jewry belief about the origin of humankind I have in mind the initial state of our universe: “Big bang.” About 13.798 billion years ago, Big bang occurred. Behold, the then primitive universe was just infinite and chaotic sea of subatomic particles like protons, neutrons, and electrons. I call them “cosmic dusts.” All things including sentient beings in the universe were indeed derived from just cosmic dusts, which were in their initial and contingent origins absolutely equal to one another! This insight should be, in my view, the real base of our cosmopolitan sense of equality; i.e. cosmopolitan sense of reverence for all sentient beings in the cosmos.

With this insight we should pursue cosmopolitan ideal opened up by Diogenes and reconstruct cosmopolitan “paideia” afresh.
References


2) Greek philosopher born in Apamea, around 135 AD.

3) Protagoras’ myth of Prometheus originally derived from Hesiodus in the late 8th-century BC Greek epic poet. Hesiodus told two versions of Prometheus’ myth; the first appeared in Hesiod’s Theogony (lines 507–616) and the second in the Works and Days (lines 42–105).

4) “I raise a παῖς (pais, child) and originally meant “upbringing”, “training” of the child.

5) Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vols. I-III, trans. Gilbert Highet, Oxford University Press, 1945. Jaeger said that “the greatest work of art they (Greeks) had to create was Man. They were the first to recognize that education means deliberately molding human character in accordance with an ideal.” Cf. Vol. I, p. xxii.

6) Isocrates (436–338 BC).

7) Isocrates regarded the rhetorical education as an art managing practical problems. He stressed civic education fitting for changing circumstances and situations.


9) At Republic Book VII 514a1-2 Socrates introduce the allegory of cave and appeals to Glaukon as follows: Μετά ταύτα δή, εἴπον, ἀπείκασον τοιοῦτο πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. (“Next,” I said, “compare our nature in respect of education [paideias] and its lack of education [apaideusias] to such an experience as this.”)

10) Cf. Republic 529b: ‘I cannot think of any study as making the mind look upwards, except one which has to do with invisible reality.’

11) The case reminds us Wittgenstein’s attitude. Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische
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12) Republic 534b3-4.
13) Symposium 210e2-6.
18) Concerning the democratic significance of Soron’s reforms see also ItoTadashi, The Ancient Greek Circumstances of the Land (Girisia no Tochi-Jijou, The First Part: ‘Solon and Land.’ Publisher Taga (伊藤正 『ギリシア古代の土地事情』 多賀出版 1999, 第1部「ソロンと土地」).
19) However Arendt argued that ”Democracy” was the term used by opponents of isonomy. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p30
21) Sport also became increasingly a monopoly of elites. In parallel with this cultural fluctuations Greek democratic ideology of amateurism in athletics also gradually declined. For example it became more and more difficult for poorer athletes to success at the great contests such as the Panathenaean or the Olympic games. “Success at the great contests required extraordinary effort and expense.” “Aristotle (perhaps writing as a contemporary) notes that one such Olympic champion, a fishmonger, was exceptional. We may also wonder how poorer athletes could afford the time and expense of training and travel to competition.” Mark Golden, Sport and Society in Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 142-143.
25) See Thanassis Samaras, *Plato on Democracy*. Peter Lang Publishing, 2002, pp. 1-7; especially p. 7: "Plato never ceased to be an anti-democrat: his last constitution is much closer to a middle of the road aristocracy than it is to the Athenian democracy of his time and fundamental elements of aristocratic ideology are forcefully reinstated in the Laws. He never ceased to be authoritarian either."


33) ‘Plato wrote a book on the One Ideal Constitution, but because of its forbidding character he could not persuade anyone to adopt it; but Alexander established more than seventy cities among savage tribes, and sowed all Asia with Grecian magistracies, and thus overcame its uncivilized and brutish manner of living. Although few of us read Plato’s *Laws*, yet hundreds of thousands have made use of Alexander’s laws, and continue to use them.’ (328d-e)

‘If, then, philosophers take the greatest pride in civilizing and rendering adaptable the intractable and untutored elements in human character, and if Alexander has been shown to have changed the savage natures of countless tribes, it is with good reason that he should be regarded as a very great philosopher.’ (329a)
More broadly, the much-admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field. This Zeno wrote, giving shape to a dream or, as it were, shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth; but it was Alexander who gave effect to the idea. For Alexander did not follow Aristotle’s advice to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader and other peoples as if he were their master.’ (329a-b)


35) Michel Foucault in Fearless Speech, Semiotext (e) 2001, p. 118 describes about Diogenes’ life and doctrine as follows: “About his actual life we do not know all that much, but it is clear that he became a kind of philosophical hero, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno of Citium, et al., were philosophical authors and authorities, for example; but they were not considered heroes. Epicurus was both a philosophical author and treated by his followers as a kind of hero. But Diogenes was primarily a heroic figure.”


37) It is notable that before Diogenes there were prominent sentiments for cosmopolitanism among Greek thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Euripides, Antiphon, Hippias, Alcidamas, and others. But Diogenes was the first protagonist among all, because of the fact that he used or made for the first time a word “κοσμοπολίτης.”
Concerning a fact that Diogenes described himself as “κοσμοπόλιτης” Malcolm Schofield in *The Stoic Idea of the City*, The University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 64 says: “he implied that he was at home nowhere –except in the universe itself. There can be little doubt that the Stoic doctrine of the cosmic city was developed as an explication of this dictum.” However, Schofield disagrees on the authenticity of Diogenes Laertius 6. 72: “… the only true commonwealth, he would insist, is that which is as wide as the universe. …” See *The Stoic Idea of the City*, pp.141-145.

38) Plutarch, *De Fortuna Alexandri*, 329c.

39) For example Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism*, First published by Methuen 1937, Bristol Classical Press 1998, p. 35 warns: “Again, asked whence he came, he replied with the famous word ‘κοσμοπόλιτης.’ I am a citizen of the world.’ It is essential not to read too much into this profession. For us ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a conception carries an emotional colour which is the legacy of Alexander, transmitted through the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church.”


42) However, even in the above quoted historiographical descriptions of Ancient Greek philosophy the validity of Nussbaum’s utterances is superficial and dubious. According to Mansfield’s judgment ‘Martha Nussbaum is one of the most eminent female philosophers of time, but when it comes to politics she is a girl scout.’ See Mansfield in Martha Nussbaum et al., 1994 quoted by Robert Fine and Robin Cohen However, even in the above quoted historiographical descriptions of Ancient Greek philosophy the validity of Nussbaum’s utterances is superficial and dubious.


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45) See my article ‘Cynic Justice’ in my Visible and Invisible in Greek Philosophy, pp. 279-288.
46) IV. 4. Cf. also IV. 23; X. 5; XII. 36.
48) Kepler’s laws challenged the long-accepted geocentric models of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and generally supported the heliocentric theory of Nicolaus Copernicus. Some eight decades later, Isaac Newton proved that relationships like Kepler’s would apply exactly under certain ideal conditions that are to a good approximation fulfilled in the solar system, as consequences of Newton’s own laws of motion and law of universal gravitation.
52) An ellipse is a closed plane curve that resembles a stretched out circle. The Sun is not at the center of the ellipse, but at one of its foci. This focal point is sometimes called the occupied focus. The other focal point, known as the empty or vacant focus has no physical significance for the orbit. The center of an ellipse is the midpoint of the line segment joining its focal points. A circle is a special case of an ellipse where both focal points coincide.
54) D. L. 6.41; 44; 45; 72
55) D. L. 6.43
56) D. L. 6.38

59) This denotes the public domain referring to the organization of citizens, i.e. to the polis as a political community. Cf. note 14. Cf. also Mariko Sakurai, Op. Cit., p. 244.


63) By using the term “Aristotelian world-view” I do not refer only to Aristotle’s world-view, but we bear in my mind Plato’s political thought lurking behind Aristotle’s political thinking. From a macroscopic range of view, the proportional logic in question was a matrix of European culture and had its own unexpected fortune. It gained acceptance in Christianity in its formative period via the creation theology brewed from an amalgam of Judaism and Greek philosophy, and became a critically significant cultural inheritance of Europeans. In due course, it gave birth to the fundamental matrix, which functioned as a prototypical reference pattern in the formation of the “sacred” European world-order. For Europeans this matrix was indeed very convenient for the purpose of justifying their “rape” of the “Barbarian” world. Because of this matrix, the native fields of the Slabs, American natives, Indians, Africans, Chinese, and even Japanese in the Far East had to suffer the mighty European’s rape and were enslaved. The situation exactly corresponds to the case that Alexander the great subjugated and stamped foreign states with “the impress of Greek government.”


66) Now, we can understand well why making use of the definition of “political animal” Aristotle was eager to exclude foreigners, *metoikoi*, slaves, and women from the citizen body. Aristotle’s formulation of the “political animal” had its own invisible dimension, i.e., a matrix as a defense mechanism by which the traditional
solidarity of the citizen body is to be protected. The logic behind this matrix may be formulated as follows: (1) the logic in question is a kind of politico-social dialectic based on a political understanding of nature (φύσις). (2) It serves for the defense of an established social order, and not for the re-forming of traditional society. (3) In its function this logic seeks to realize a close-packed integration (=equalization ἴσας χείρ) by the medium of which conflicting social parties can be integrated into a pyramid-like stratified organization. (4) The essence of the logic consists in free use of analogy (ἀνάλογοι) which establishes a standard (μέτρον) as a mean proportional (τὸ μέσον) be-tween conflicting parties. (5) The proportional logic in question does never away with conflicts be-tween two extremes, because of a fact that the existence of opposition between them is a raison d’être of the mean (τὸ μέσον). (6) Thus leaving the antithetical extremes as they are the logic assimilates (ἴσας χείρ) and dissimilates (ἀνίσας χείρ) them at the same time. (7) And finally the logic in question regards the difference between them as a by nature fixed one and attributes it to the real order (φύσις). See my article ‘Political Animal’ in Visible and Invisible in Greek Philosophy, p. 240.


72) Aristotle, Politics, 1328b.

73) Aristotle, Politics, 1252a5-6. In the Book VII of the Politics Aristotle says: “The polis is one form of association of similar people (κοινοί τις τῶν ὁμοίων)” and its object is the best life that is possible, i.e. “the happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as the greatest good.” (1328a85ff)

74) See my article ‘Political Animal’ in Visible and Invisible in Greek Philosophy, pp. 221-246.

75) Plato, Apology, 23b. Cf. also 30a.
76) See DL. 6.104 & 7.121.
78) See Arrian, History of Alexander and Indica, 4.0.5-12.5; Plutarch, Lives VII, 54.3-55.1. Cf. also John Maxwell O’Brien, Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy, A Biography, Routledge, 1994, 142-3; 144; 147.
79) Concerning the significance of “παρησία” in Diogenes’ doctrine see Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, Semiotext(e), 2001, especially pp.11-24; 84-87; 103-107; 115-133.
80) This utterance may be regarded as a critical judgment about Aristotelian justice in reciprocity (τὸ ἀντικειμένος δίκαιον).
81) See Plutarch, Lycurgus, 31.2.
83) See DL.6.73.
85) See for example Lk. 18.14; 6.20; Mt. 21.31 et al.
86) Cf. Doyne Dawson, Cities of the Gods, Communist Utopias in Greek Thought, Oxford University Press, 1992, 118-119; Cf. also R. Bracht Branham, ‘Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism,’ in R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (ed) The Cynics, the Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, University of California Press, 1996, 93: “Mary Douglas has argued, the form of a joke “rarely lies in the utterance alone” and can only be understood with reference “to the total social situation.” The Cynics’ innovation consists of exploiting this fact polemically as a way of defining themselves in opposition—not to this or that group, but to the authority of society to dictate thought and behavior. … The Cynic motto— “Deface the Current Coin” (paracharattein to nomisma)—makes joking, parody, and satire not merely a useful rhetorical tool, but an indispensable one, constitutive of Cynic ideology as such. Humor is the chisel stamp of Cynic discourse.”
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87) D.L. 6.85.
88) Plato, _Republic_, II, 369D.
89) _Republic_, 372E.
90) _Republic_, 372C.
92) _Crito_, 53c.
93) _Crito_, 48b.
94) _Crito_, 54b.
95) _Crito_, 50e.
96) Plato, _Apology_, 23b. Cf. also 30a.
97) _Apology_, 37d.
98) Plato, _Phaedo_, 118a17.
99) D.L. 2.105.
100) _Crito_, 52c-d.
101) For the original indictment, see DL. 2.40.
102) D.L. 6.38.
103) _Apology_, 31a.
104) Thucydides, 2. 37. 3.
105) See Sakurai Mariko, ’Lysias to Socrates’ in _Socrates no Rinjin-tachi (Socrates’ Neighbors)_ Publisher Yamakawa, Tokyo, 1997, 241-255.
106) Epictetus, Book I, IX, 1-6: “If what is said by the philosophers regarding the kinship of God and men be true, what other course remains for men but that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never to say “I am an Athenian,” or “I am a Corinthian,” but “I am a citizen of the universe” ? For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning merely that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth? Or is it clear you take the place which has a higher degree of authority and comprehends not merely that corner of yours, but also your family and, in a word, the source from which your race has come, your ancestors down to yourself, and from some such entity call yourself “Athenian,” or “Corinthian”? Well, then anyone who has attentively studied the administration of the universe and has learned that “the greatest and most authoritative and most comprehensive of all governments is this one,
which is composed of men and God, and that from Him have descended the seeds of being, not merely to my father or to my grandfather, but to all things that are begotten and that grow upon earth, and chiefly to rational beings, seeing that by nature it is theirs alone to have communion in the society of God, being intertwined with him through the reason,” why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the universe?”


110) See DL6.73.

111) It is a noteworthy fact that in the Aristotelian best régime, all the individuals who are women, *metoikoi*, slaves, and almost all productive laborers could not hope to have share in the legislation (*νομοθέτημα*) of happy life. Aristotle regards the laboring class not only as fellows who are “ignoble” and “inimical to virtue,” but also as fellows who are never worthy of having a share of the common advantage which should exclusively be distributed among the citizens, whereas according to him “the most nobly constituted polis” necessarily aims at “the most supreme of all goods.”

112) DL 6.29.

113) Here I remember Marcus Aurelius’ words: “It makes no difference whether a person lives here or there, provided that, wherever he lives, he lives as a citizen of the world.” The Meditations, 10.15. Indianapolis, hacker, 1983.

114) See my Japanese book 『哲学者デイオゲネス—世界市民の原像—』講談社（Tetsugakusha Diogenes, Sekaisimin no Genzo, Diogenes the Philosopher, The Original Figure of Cosmopolitan), Kodansha, 2008, Chapter 9, pp. 273-299.


116) See my article ‘Political Animal’ in my Visible and Invisible in Greek Philosophy, pp. 221-302. Aristotle says at Politics 1254b4-1255a2 as follows: “It is
clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind over the passionate part, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good with animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sorts are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another’s and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals can-not even apprehend a principle; they obey their passions. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies’ minister to the needs of life. …It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.” (Translation by B. Jowett)

117) See my detailed analysis in Visible and Invisible in Greek Philosophy, pp. 233-238.


122) John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press. p.118 Rawls put it as follows: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.”

123) According to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary “contingency”
is defined as (1) dependence on chance or on the fulfillment of a condition; uncertainty, (2) a contingent event; a chance, accident, or possibility conditional on something uncertain and (3) something incidental to something else.


125) By the word “cosmic dusts” I have in mind Japanese cosmopolitan poet Kenji Miyazawa’s appeal to his peasant students: “Boys, be sparkling cosmic dusts at first! Then let us disperse ourselves towards the boundless space all together!” ‘A Synoptic view of Peasant Art’ (*Nomim geijutsuron Gaiyou* 農民芸術論概要).
Describing the original meaning and the historical development of the Greek concept of “paideia,” I have noticed a fact that even at the initial stage of its appearance there were two prominent and antithetically different strands of cosmopolitanism, hence also the ideas of cosmopolitan paideia; the one originating from Diogenes of Sinope and the other from Alexander the great respectively.

In spite of a fact that Diogenes began to preach his “cosmopolitanism” at the same time when Macedonian men of power were assuming the hegemony of Mediterranean world, until now his significance in the cosmopolitan tradition of paideia has been given but scant attention.

In comparison with the strong legacy of Alexander the great in the Hellenistic period, which has been incessantly transmitted through the tradition of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, Diogenes’ words and thought have been ignored or underestimated. The significance of his cosmopolitan “paideia” too has been disdainfully neglected and not always been appropriately evaluated. Thus, whenever one speaks about Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, he/she has often misunderstood it and immediately regarded it as a shadowy ghost of Hellenistic tradition of education.

In this paper, following Diogenes’ mission “παραχάραξον τὸ νόμισμα” (deface the currency!) I have defaced this even now prevalent and current misinterpretation of the so-called cosmopolitan paideia. And I have suggested a route which may lead us to the new conception of cosmopolitan “paideia.”
付 記

「竹中暁雄教授退任記念号」と銘打つ本号の出版をもって、『人間科学』（HUMAN SCIENCES REVIEW）は終焉するという。「教育学」(pedagogy)を職業として40年の長きにわたり本学に奉職されてきた一教授の退任。そして、"humanitas" という理念にかかわって出版されてきた一学術誌の廃刊。これら二つの出来事が意味するもの、それは何であるか。

人間科学の焦点に“humanitas”（フマニタス）の理念があった。人間科学とは、元々、ローマにおいて始まったリベラル・アーツ（artes liberales）の伝統に端を発し、その理念としての“humanitas”を軸として形成される知の体系にはかならなかった。

キケロを嚆矢とするローマの知識人たちが“humanitas”と目したもの、それはプラトンやイソクラテスの時代のアテネにおいて確立されたπαιδεία（パイデイア）の伝統であった。爾後、その伝統は人間教育の根幹となった。ヨーロッパを中心に形成されてきた世界諸文化の竜骨となった。そして、連綿として現代にまで伝わって来た。

それゆえにわたしは思う、本学『人間科学』廃刊の宣告が意味するもの、それは、この伝統に対するアンチテーゼ、一つの根本的な異議申し立てであったのかもしれない、しかもそれには正当な理由があったのかもしれない、と。

戦後におけるわが国高等教育政策は、一贯して、「一般教育」ないし「教養教育」をいわゆる「専門教育」の下位に位置づけて差別化するものであった。

本学『人間科学』終焉の宣告は、その根本方針をあらためて青い、追認するものであったかのようだ。その根拠には、「パイデイア／フマニタス」系の学びは、所詮、無用の飾りにすぎぬ、という考えがあったのかもしれない。

若き日、同志社大学神学部の古風な塔の中の一教室で、岩倉具実先生の指導の下で読んだギリシア語練習問題の一文を思い出す。曰く、「パイデイアは、幸運な人々にとっては飾り（コスモス）であるが、不幸な人々にとっては避難所（カタフューゲー）である」、と。

『人間科学』廃刊の決定が意味するところは深長だと言わなければならない。
TWO STRANDS OF COSMOPOLITAN PAIDEIA

い。事実、わが国のみならず欧米をはじめとする諸国において、「教育」・「教養」がたんに富める人々・幸せな人々・支配者階級に属する人々の誇りをひくべきか、『飾り』にすぎず、その反面、教育の機会を奪われた人々・貧しい人々を痛めつける格差の道具となってきた歴史がある。

その伝統は、遙かなる昔、アレクサンドロス大王が押し開いたヘレニズム時代のエリート教育に遡る。西洋教育の伝統はヘレニズム期に発し、ローマ時代に花開き、ルネサンス期に熟成したフマニタスの理念を継承する仕方で形成されてきた。それゆえに、その潮流の来方・行く末を省みて「パイデイア／フマニタス」の伝統を断罪し、死を宣するのは、むしろ健全かつ賢明な態度だ・称賛されなければならないのかもしれない。その伝統は過去の大罪の累々たる堆積にすぎず、断罪にこそ値する。その伝統に頼むべきものは、もはや何かとない、と。

だが、世界市民的「パイデイア／フマニタス」教育の伝統には、アレクサンドロス大王やその師アリストテレスの思想に対抗し、彼らのめざした方向とは違う。したがっても、わが国によって西洋教育の主流をなしてきたい伝統とも食い違う、いまひとつ別の流れがあったことを知るべきだ。「おれは世界市民だ」と名乗ったキュニコス派の始祖ディオゲネスが開いたそれである。

今日、地球上を覆っているさまざまな災厄、グローバルな自然破壊、環境破壊、戦争や飢餓、テロリズム等に対処すべく、適切でヒューマンな行動を起し、最近の原発問題において如実となったような「無知の暴走」の本質を暴き、人間の未来を宇宙史的観点から俯瞰・構想しうる、高いインテリジェンスをもった人材が求められている。おのれの置かれた時代の運命を決然と受容し、人為はすべて自然内の出来事であると遠観・洞察して、己ひとりの利害にかかわる欲望や情念に決して屈することのない、理性の人が求められている。

ディオゲネスは言った、「デュケー（偶然）にはタルソス（勇気）を、ノモス（ひとの習わし）にはフユシス（自然本来のもの）を、パトス（情念）にはロゴス（理性）を対抗させるのだ」(DL 32・3), と。
そうした人材は少数あれど済む, というわけではない。否, 無数に必要だ。人類の未来のために働くそうした人たちは, 「まずもろともに輝く宇宙の微塵となって無方の空に散らばろう」（宮沢賢治『農民芸術論概要』）という気概の持ち主でなければならない。

友よ, そうした人材を育成するためには, われわれこそが率先して, 世界（宇宙）市民的「パイデイア／フマニタス」の伝統を掘り起こし, 時代の要請に応えるべく, 新しく再構築していかなければならないのではないか。