@article{oai:stars.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004803,
 author = {中野, 瑞彦 and Nakano, Mitsuhiko},
 issue = {3/4},
 journal = {桃山学院大学経済経営論集, ST. ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {This paper aims to record the history of the Japan's Heisei financial crisis and policies of the financial authority. The financial crisis from 1997 to 2003 was the biggest shock in the Japanese financial market after the Second World War. Japanese banks lost more than 100 trillion yen for the disposal of non-performing loans. In around 2000 the character of non-performing loan problem changed from defeat processing after the bubble burst to the embodiment of Heisei recession with the general deterioration of the loan credit by the deflation progress. "The 13 city banks system" which had continued for almost 40 years collapsed and many small and medium sized financial institutions went bankrupt. The myth that any single bank in Japan never collapses was broken suddenly. In order to save the financial system the government finally prepared 60 trillion yen of the public fund with strict inspection against large banks. As the result most of large banks became the large deficit settlement of accounts and the uneasiness of the money market was not settled. In May 2003 2 trillion yen of the public fund was injected into the Resona Bank, which was a member of the large banks, at the edge of precipice of the bankruptcy. It was recognized that "too big to fail" rule was still alive. The financial market regained calm and the crisis ended. The miserable situation of Japanese financial crisis was due to poor and slow policies of the financial authority with structural fall of the economy. In other words the duration of Japanese financial crisis would have been shorter with quick and appropriate policies., 9, KJ00006132399, 論文, Article},
 pages = {185--205},
 title = {バブル ホウカイ ゴ ノ フリョウ サイケン モンダイ ショウシ バブル ホウカイ ト ギンコウ ハタン ケイザイ ガクブ カイセツ 50シュウネン キネンゴウ},
 volume = {51},
 year = {2010},
 yomi = {ナカノ, ミツヒコ}
}