@article{oai:stars.repo.nii.ac.jp:00009567,
 author = {上野, 勝男 and UENO, Katsuo},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {桃山学院大学経済経営論集, ST.ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW},
 month = {Jul},
 note = {For a long time until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the orthodox
interpretation of the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union was
that the mass collectivization movement from below frustrated the
resistance of the kulaks, the capitalist forces in the countryside, and
collectivization was achieved. The reality, however, was quite the opposite.
Collectivization was driven by the policy of “extermination of the kulaks as
a class,” which targeted the “kulaks,” the core rural businessmen and the
relatively wealthy peasantry, as its decisive leverage. This was the key to
unraveling Fitzpatrickʼs paradox that collectivization “not only drove the
peasants to the kolkhoz, but also drove them from the countryside. The
“extermination of the kulaks as a class” was indeed the stateʼs repression of
the peasantry through sheer violence. The “extermination of the kulaks as
a class” was indeed a state repression of the peasantry by outright
violence, which tore millions of peasants and their families from their
native land and exiled them to the harsh natural conditions of the Soviet
North, where few people lived. The collectivization of agriculture, using
this repression as a lever, devastated the Soviet peasantry, agriculture, and
farming villages as a whole. The peasants who had lost their business
prospects left their villages for the cities and industry if they did not join
the kolkhoz. The years of collectivization were at the same time years of
mass peasant migration to the cities, known as the Exodus.},
 pages = {1--53},
 title = {「資本の本源的蓄積」とソ連／ロシア(下)-２},
 volume = {64},
 year = {2022},
 yomi = {ウエノ, カツオ}
}