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コーポレート・ガバナンスと経営者報酬(中田信正教授退任記念号)
https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4550
https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/45506ff4ad8f-45dd-480a-af70-91f5edda70b8
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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KJ00005058192.pdf (1.7 MB)
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Item type | [ELS]紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-03-21 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | コーポレート・ガバナンスと経営者報酬(中田信正教授退任記念号) | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation(Special Issue Dedicated to Professor Nobumasa NAKATA) | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | エージェンシー論 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | ストック・オプション | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | 長期的インセンティブ | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | リスク・ベアリング | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | entrenchment | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
雑誌書誌ID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN00240555 | |||||
著者 |
稲別, 正晴
× 稲別, 正晴× INABETSU, Masaharu |
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著者所属(日) | ||||||
値 | 桃山学院大学経営学部 | |||||
著者所属(英) | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
値 | St. Andrew's University | |||||
記事種別(日) | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 論文 | |||||
記事種別(英) | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | Article | |||||
抄録(英) | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | The compensation of top executives is a subject that has generated much debate in the United States since 1980s due to the large increases in executive compensation of leading companies. Agency theory has emerged as the principal theory guiding research on the pay-performance relationship. Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. However, much agency-based empirical work done on the determinants of compensation in the last thirty years shows that there is only a very weak statistical link between executive compensation and corporate performance. An understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing an effective corporate governance system. This paper reviews some research on pay for performance of CEOs and suggests a more integrated approach, including non-economic factors. Section 2 describes the pay trends and forms of long-term incentives of top executives in the United States. Section 3 reviews some agency-based empirical research on top executives pay. Section 4 discusses that executive risk-bearing is contingent on the situations and that executives can entrench themselves by influencing the CEO-Board relationship. Section 5 is concluding remarks. | |||||
書誌情報 |
桃山学院大学経済経営論集 en : ST. ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 巻 43, 号 4, p. 67-97, 発行日 2002-03-01 |
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表示順 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 8 | |||||
アクセション番号 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | KJ00005058192 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 02869721 |